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PLEDGE YOUR BODY FOR YOUR BREAD: WELFARE, DRUG
TESTING, AND THE INFERIOR FOURTH AMENDMENT
Jordan C. Budd*
ABSTRACT
Proposals to subject welfare recipients to periodic drug testing have emerged over
the last three years as a significant legislative trend across the United States.  Since
2007, over half of the states have considered bills requiring aid recipients to submit to
invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance.  The vast
majority of the legislation imposes testing without regard to suspected drug use, re-
flecting the implicit assumption that the poor are inherently predisposed to culpable
conduct and thus may be subject to class-based intrusions that would be inarguably
impermissible if inflicted on the less destitute.  These proposals are gaining increas-
ingly substantial political support, suggesting that the enactment of drug testing legis-
lation is now a real and immediate prospect.
Given the gravity of the suspicionless searches at issue, the proposals raise serious
concerns under conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Nevertheless, there is con-
siderable doubt whether the federal courts will accede to that authority and prohibit
the proposed intrusions, given the long tradition of relegating the privacy rights of
the poor to inferior and indifferent enforcement.  This Article explores these legisla-
tive developments and the constitutional context within which they arise, and makes
the case for using the impending battle over suspicionless drug testing to reclaim for
the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
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We are sending the absolutely wrong signal to the next generation
about what is needed to get ahead in life if we don’t threaten benefits
for recipients who won’t even lift a finger to help themselves or their
children. . . .  I am hearing from people who accept random drug
testing as a condition for their jobs.  They see no problem with having
people on public assistance doing the same.1
INTRODUCTION
In 1275, an English woman named Alice Crese failed to pay Richard of Ely for
two shillings’ worth of bread.2  Richard brought her before the Court of St. Ives Fair,
which ordered that she “pledge her body” for the debt.3  Seven centuries later, the poor
still face the prospect of pledging their bodies for the debt of bread.  Legislatures across
the United States are considering scores of drug testing proposals that will require the
indigent to periodically submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing con-
dition of public assistance.4  The majority of the proposals require no suspicion of
drug use whatsoever; they rest instead on the implicit notion that the poor are intrin-
sically predisposed to immoral conduct and that, once indebted, their bodies are the
domain of the state in any event.5  Not surprisingly, the proposals face nearly insur-
mountable difficulties under conventional Fourth Amendment authority.  Perhaps more
surprisingly, there is great uncertainty whether the federal courts will accede to that
1 Andre Bauer, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, Culture of Dependency Must be
Broken, TIMES AND DEMOCRAT (Orangeburg, S.C.), Feb. 13, 2010, available at http://www
.thetandd.com/news/opinion/columnists/article_6b97a743-e3f6-5747-874e-0026fe6c3674.html.
2 Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval
‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 704 n.54 (2006).
3 Id.
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 See infra Part II.A.1 & II.A.2.
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authority and prohibit the proposed search practices, given a series of recent decisions
that have upheld related privacy intrusions in defiance of apparently controlling law.6 
This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context
within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle to reclaim
for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
The poor as a class live largely beyond the Constitution.  Unlike the indigent in
many comparable constitutional states, impoverished Americans enjoy no positive
socioeconomic rights nor any appreciable protection against discriminatory state action. 
Recent scholarship has characterized this absence of rights recognition as the “decon-
stitutionalization” of American poverty law7—a description that the United States
Supreme Court itself would likely embrace.8  The rhetoric of American constitutional-
ism, however, holds fast to the assertion that rights of general applicability in fact
apply equally and without regard to socioeconomic status.  The law may be indifferent
to the poor, we are told, but it certainly bears them no ill will.9  The claim is demon-
strably false.  In several contexts—the Fourth Amendment prominent among them—
American law effectively if disguisedly denies the indigent the full force of generally
applicable constitutional guarantees, thus establishing a dual system of rights enforce-
ment that relegates the poor to subconstitutional status.10  Beyond declarations of
formal neutrality, this veiled truth lies at the core of the nation’s constitutional rela-
tionship with the dispossessed: the enforced Constitution is not only blind to poverty
but frequently antagonistic to it as well.11  Thus the poor live not merely beyond the
Constitution but also beneath it, at once deconstitutionalized and subconstitutionalized
in relation to the law.
This Article considers the subconstitutional dimension of American poverty law
in relation to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.  Privacy intrusions that are plainly
impermissible in analogous contexts are regularly imposed on the poor and upheld by
the courts based on the improbable recharacterization of otherwise applicable doctrine
or, as likely, its disregard.  The willingness of the judiciary to suspend or dilute core
6 See infra Parts I.B.2 & II.D.2.
7 See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law,
Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629–36 (2008) [hereinafter
No Scrutiny].
8 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic,
social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court.”).
9 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (noting aspiration to “[p]rovid[e]
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike”); cf. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,
Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1358–59 (1993) (“[E]quality
of formal rights are to be scrupulously maintained . . . but the immeasurably greater political
inequalities that flow from private wealth through less visible and more ad hoc processes
may not be disturbed.”).
10 See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355 (2010).
11 See infra Part I.B.
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constitutional protections in this respect is consistent with the longstanding concep-
tion of the poor as inherently prone to and deserving of their predicament.  Imagined
as criminally predisposed and morally bereft, the indigent constitute a presumptively
culpable class and, accordingly, face status-based intrusions that would be otherwise
irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on individualized suspicion.12 
This biased and bifurcated rights analysis is sufficiently well-established to merit its
recent characterization as a “poverty exception” to the Fourth Amendment.13
The next chapter of this constitutional assault is now being written in legislatures
across the country.  Over the last three years, over half of the states have considered
legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory screening for drug
use.14  Some of the proposals are relatively innocuous, involving written question-
naires and recommended treatment protocols for individuals whose responses suggest
the possibility of drug dependence.15  Most of the proposals, however, are far more
severe, often requiring that every recipient submit to the invasive extraction of bodily
fluids and barring assistance to anyone testing positive.16  Recently, members of the
United States Congress have joined the cavalcade and introduced legislation requir-
ing states that administer federal welfare funds to conduct blanket drug testing of all
program participants.17
To date, only one state has implemented a suspicionless and invasive testing re-
quirement, although several others have enacted less onerous variants.18  In 1999,
Michigan passed a mandatory testing law that conditioned public assistance for every
adult recipient on a clean urinalysis report.19  The statute was challenged immediately
and struck down by a federal district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit.20  The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and produced a perfectly ambiguous resolution: the court divided equally on the
question, with six judges voting to uphold the testing requirement and six voting to
12 See infra Part I.B.3.
13 Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391 (2003); cf. ACLU Challenges Invasive Home Searches Of Welfare Recipients in San Diego
Area, ACLU, July 24, 2000, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-challenges-inva
sive-home-searches-welfare-recipients-san-diego-area (“There is no poverty exception to the
Fourth Amendment . . . . No one should be forced to waive her constitutional rights and submit
to an unannounced, personally humiliating, and suspicionless search of her home just because
she is in need of public assistance.”).
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 See infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Part II.C.1 and II.C.2.
17 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
18 See infra Part II.B.
19 Pub. Act No. 17, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 49–50 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §
400.57l (2009)).
20 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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strike it down, thus reinstating the lower court’s injunction but failing to clarify the
constitutional question in any respect.21
Not surprisingly, the evenly divided outcome has been taken not as a repudiation
of such extraordinarily overreaching proposals but as an encouraging sign that the
federal courts may well uphold such intrusions.22  In the years since the conclusion of
the Michigan case, legislatures across the country have considered scores of bills pro-
posing testing requirements of equal or harsher application.23  The proposals have
garnered ever-increasing and, recently, quite substantial support.24  It thus appears that
other states may soon follow Michigan’s lead and require the federal courts to finally
resolve the permissibility of blanket drug testing as a condition of public assistance. 
Based on the judiciary’s approach to other seemingly impermissible intrusions upon
the privacy of the poor, as well as the divided resolution in the Michigan litigation, the
prospects of vindicating the constitutional rights of aid recipients is uncertain at best.
The Article is divided into two parts.  Part One provides a brief overview of the
relationship of the poor to the United States Constitution, describing both the overt
exclusion of socioeconomic class from constitutional recognition and the veiled
subordination of the poor with respect to the enforcement of generally applicable
constitutional rights.  The primary focus of the discussion is an elaboration of the
subconstitutional characteristic of poverty law in the specific context of the Fourth
Amendment’s right to privacy, which sets the stage for the emerging controversy
over the blanket drug testing of welfare recipients.
Part Two turns to the prospect of invasive drug testing as a condition of public
assistance and presents the results of a national survey of related legislation over the
last three years.  As the survey reveals, bills with increasingly harsh provisions are
being introduced in greater numbers each year and proceeding further through the
legislative process, suggesting that the ultimate enactment of drug testing legislation
may soon occur.  Considering the absence of any data to suggest that the incidence
of drug abuse among the poor is appreciably greater than in the general population,
coupled with the harsh and disparaging rhetoric surrounding many of the current
legislative proposals, this emerging political groundswell evidently seeks to vindicate
little more than the familiar impulse to stigmatize and stereotype the impoverished.
In conclusion, Part Two contrasts the profound constitutional deficiencies of the
harshest of these proposals under conventional doctrine with the irreconcilable approach
of recent decisions sanctioning equally severe privacy intrusions upon the poor.  When
21 Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
22 See, e.g., Allan Greenblatt, Should Welfare Recipients Get Drug Testing?, NPR (Mar.
31, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125387528 (“[The sponsor
of drug testing legislation in Kansas] thinks the constitutionality of the drug-testing regime
is itself ‘definitely worth testing.’ The Michigan case was decided by a tied vote, which [the
sponsor] believes is ‘hardly a definite decision against states’ rights.’”).
23 See infra Part II.C.
24 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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the time comes for the federal courts to finally resolve the constitutionality of suspi-
cionless drug testing proposals, these two lines of authority will present the judiciary
with a clear and defining choice: either to reset the relationship of our nation’s poor
to the promise of equal justice, or to betray again the integrity of constitutional adju-
dication itself.
I. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The current debate over the drug testing of welfare recipients proceeds in the
shadow of a substantial “if somewhat improvised and largely impoverished”25 body
of constitutional authority addressing the rights of the American poor.  It is a familiar
refrain that the jurisprudence accounts for class in a manner that unambiguously dis-
favors the indigent.26  This general proposition in turn reflects at least three interrelated
but distinct doctrinal themes.  First, as a matter of express constitutional policy, the
American poor enjoy no positive rights to socioeconomic security, irrespective of
the magnitude of the deprivation at issue.27  Second, and also as a matter of express
doctrine, the American poor receive no special solicitude when defending against dis-
criminatory state action and thus may be subject to virtually any burden that does not
violate otherwise applicable constitutional constraints.28  Finally, with respect to the
enforcement of generally applicable constraints, American law implicitly differentiates
on the basis of class by diluting the poor’s exercise of rights that purport to apply with-
out regard to socioeconomic status.29  Taken together, these interrelated processes—the
express denial of positive socioeconomic rights, the express denial of protected status,
and the implicit dilution of generally applicable rights—render much of the Constitution
irrelevant at best, and hostile at worst, to the American poor.  Nowhere is that theme
more powerfully evident than with respect to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
A. The Declared Constitution and the Irrelevance of Class
In significant contrast to the basic law of most comparable nations, the United
States Constitution treats socioeconomic status as formally irrelevant in almost all
respects.30  This approach has been characterized as the “deconstitutionalization” of
25 Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (2009).
26 See, e.g., id., passim; Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1305–13; Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note
7, at 629–36; James G. Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 402–15 (1990).
27 See infra Part I.A.
28 Id.
29 See infra Part I.B.
30 See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in
State Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution treats questions of eco-
nomic inequality as matters of policy largely immune from scrutiny by the judicial branch.”).
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American poverty law31 and is embedded in the federal judiciary’s broader retreat from
fundamental rights enforcement over the last forty years.32  This indifference to class
dictates a distinctive approach to positive socioeconomic rights as well as negative
protections against discriminatory state action.
With respect to positive rights, American constitutional law unambiguously rejects
any affirmative claim to minimal material security33 despite repeated calls for the recog-
nition of such interests.34  As then-judge Antonin Scalia wrote in 1986, “It is impos-
sible to say that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposition of even so
basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the destitute.”35  Most
generally, the doctrine is but one manifestation of a broader conception of the Consti-
tution as a guarantor of negative rights that imposes no affirmative duty on the state
to protect or sustain the populace.36  In particular, the absence of positive socioeconomic
rights reflects the fact that the Constitution lacks express language addressing such
One of the few exceptions to this principle is the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which
imposes an affirmative state obligation to provide representation for indigent defendants.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
17–19 (1956). The Court has also barred economic discrimination in the exercise of the fran-
chise. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667–68 (1966). Outside the context of
criminal prosecutions and the right to vote, however, American constitutional law is generally
indifferent to the fact that poverty may impair or preclude the exercise of other rights. See,
e.g., infra notes 58–59.
31 See Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at 629–36.
32 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 123–24 (2004) (discussing deconstitutionalization of education-related interests of
racial minorities and the poor); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1118–20 (1978) (discussing the decon-
stitutionalization of criminal procedure); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the
Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics,
and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388, 423–24 (1991) (discussing “the Court’s de-
constitutionalization of basic aspects of the freedom of religious conscience”).
33 See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“The
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not
require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order.”); Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question
Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1134–35 (2006).
34 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 141–65 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19–43 (1987); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1254–56 (1965); Lawrence G. Sager,
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 410, 429–33 (1993).
35 Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2.
36 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768–69 (2005); DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); West, supra note 33, at 1134–35.
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interests,37 unlike the majority of constitutions enacted in the modern era,38 as well
as a national sentiment that is relatively unreceptive to redistributionist principles39 and
an increasingly conservative Supreme Court that for forty years has emphatically
rejected any reading of the Constitution that might accommodate such values.40
This defining characteristic of the American approach to social welfare contrasts
with the recognition by most comparable constitutional states of some minimal interest
in health, education, and material security as an element of protected human dignity.41
The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has held that “the right to health . . . [is]
protected by the [Italian] Constitution as an inviolable part of human dignity.  There
can be no question that the right of poorer citizens . . . to free health care comes under
this heading.”42  German constitutional doctrine likewise exempts from taxation “in-
come that is minimally necessary for a humane existence—a ‘subsistence mini-
mum . . . .’”43  The law of most European nations follows suit,44 and the obligations
imposed by the leading international treaty on socioeconomic rights bind most other
nations to similar commitments.45  Conspicuously, the United States is not among the
160 states that are party to the agreement.46
37 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3–4, 8 (2005).
38 Id. at 4.
39 See, e.g., id. at 17–19; cf. Dennis Jacobe, Americans Oppose Income Redistribution To Fix
Economy, GALLUP (June 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108445/americans-oppose
-income-redistribution-fix-economy.aspx (noting that 84% of surveyed adults oppose taking
steps to distribute wealth more evenly among Americans).
40 Sunstein, supra note 37, at 19–23; Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 123–24.
41 See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 220 (2008).
42 Corte Cost., 16 Luglio 1999, n. 309, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1999, 29 (It.), translated in
NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1363 (2d ed. 2010).
43 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 10, 1998, 99
ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 216 (Ger.), translated in
DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354.
44 See, e.g., DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354; TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 220;
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 3–4.
45 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; see, e.g.,
John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 201 (2009).
Article 11 of the Covenant recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions.” ICESCR art. 11, ¶1. Articles 12 and 13 recognize corollary
rights to health and education. ICESCR art. 12, 13. In view of these provisions, “a State party
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is,
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.” U.N. Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], Gen. Comment No. 3, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/22-E
/CN.4/1991/1 Annex III (1990).
46 U.N. Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf. The
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The formal irrelevance of class in the American system also bears on the scope
of the poor’s negative protections against discriminatory state action.  Under equal
protection doctrine, special scrutiny is brought to bear on discriminatory enactments
that draw suspect classifications.47  To qualify as suspect, a legislative classification
must target a class that is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”48 
For decades scholars have made the case that indigence meets these core criteria and
that the poor accordingly should be entitled to heightened scrutiny when challenging
class-based legislative burdens.49  While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the
idea,50 it ultimately and definitively rejected the proposition in Dandridge v. Williams51
and a series of subsequent cases in which the Court withdrew entirely from the field and
suspended review of virtually all discriminatory classifications burdening the poor.52 
As John Hart Ely summarized, “the retreat from the once glittering crusade to extend
special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a rout.”53  Discriminatory
enactments targeting the indigent accordingly receive the lowest and most permissive
degree of scrutiny, requiring only that there be some conceivably rational basis for the
government to burden the poor as it has.54  As a practical matter, this prohibits little
more than legislative animus.55
United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but the Senate never ratified the treaty. Id.; see
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 15.
47 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
48 San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28; see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974);
William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45
UCLA L. REV. 385, 415–16 (1997).
49 See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 117–30; Edelman, supra note 34;
Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1306–13; Michelman, Forward, supra note 34, at 21; Lawrence Sagar,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV.
767, 785–87 (1969).
50 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
51 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
52 Id. at 487; see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548–51 (1972); Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1306–13 (summarizing
case authority).
53 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148 (1980).
54 See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 508
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 See West, supra note 33, at 1137 (“Thus, it is arguable, given our doctrine, that legislators
cannot deny to poor people rights or privileges or goods solely on the grounds of their poverty,
where that poverty bears no relation to any legitimate public purpose.”); cf. Loffredo, supra note
9, at 1283–84.
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The practical consequences of this doctrinal indifference cut sharply against the
interests of the poor.  As commentators have often observed, the construed Constitu-
tion’s formal neutrality on questions of class is highly discriminatory in its secondary
substantive effects56—an elaboration of Anatole France’s familiar remark that the law
in its “majestic equality . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”57  Without the minimal resources necessary
to access and exercise rights, the promise of formal neutrality is substantively hollow:
a poor woman cannot exercise her right to abortion if she cannot purchase the proce-
dure,58 nor can the poor exercise equal rights of political participation if they cannot buy
access to the conversation itself.59  Likewise, without heightened negative protections
against discriminatory legislation, the poor are at the practical mercy of lawmakers
whose political debts rarely trace back to empty pockets.  Robert Bork’s infamous
assertion in 1979 that “the poor and the minorities . . . have done very well” in the po-
litical process, and thus need no special protection from it,60 has been reduced to ma-
levolent farce by the intervening three decades of legislative animosity and escalating
distress among America’s indigent.61
The rights deficit of the American poor influences the terms of political discourse
as well.  Irrespective of the degree to which positive socioeconomic rights are judicially
enforceable—and there is great disparity in that regard among nations recognizing
such interests62—the mere articulation of a right can legitimate corresponding claims
in the political sphere.63  Citing the experience of South Africa, Frank Michelman
56 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Cluster III—Introduction, 55 FLA. L. REV. 319, 334–35 (2003);
West, supra note 33, at 1138.
57 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., John Lane Co. 1914)
(1894).
58 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 434 U.S. 464, 470–71
(1977).
59 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting as illegitimate any “governmental
interest in equalizing the relative [economic] ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections [as an incident of the First Amendment].”).
60 Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 701 (“The premise that the poor or the black are underrepresented politically
is quite dubious. In the past two decades we have witnessed an explosion of welfare legislation,
massive income redistributions, and civil rights laws of all kinds. . . . [T]he welfare-rights theory
rests less on demonstrated fact than on a liberal shibboleth.”).
61 See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 376–80; Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy
Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4–5,
9, 12 (2009) [hereinafter Forty Years]; Mark R. Rank, Rethinking the Scope and Impact of
Poverty in the United States, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170–76 (2007).
62 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1898–1909 (2004).
63 See, e.g., id. at 1901; cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1364–65 (1988).
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describes how merely declaratory socioeconomic rights supply “a useful basis on which
to engage governments in a kind of public cross-examination of their relevant laws and
policies.”64  Julie Nice conversely notes that the rights deficit in the American context
contributes to “a dialogic default on the very question of economic justice.”65  As Nice
argues, the inability of the American poor to ground political advocacy in rights rhetoric
has frustrated their claims to social and economic inclusion, which in turn has rein-
forced the perceived illegitimacy of corresponding claims in the judicial context.66
B. The Veiled Constitution and Class Bias
As the preceding sketch suggests, the declared Constitution is unapologetically
indifferent to class.  Proponents concede that the doctrine offers scant hope for the poor
but assert that the case for distributive justice is moral, not constitutional, and thus must
be made outside the judicial sphere.67  In this respect, the law as it relates to poverty
is overtly deconstitutionalized; it frankly acknowledges the irrelevance of class and
accepts with relative candor the harsh substantive implications of that precept.  As
others have thoroughly documented, it is a jurisprudence that defies the effects of
poverty on the exercise of basic rights while failing to “center[] class in the judicial
analysis or creat[e] a humane and robust constitutional jurisprudence for socioeco-
nomic disparity.”68
For all of its manifest failings, however, the doctrine of class indifference is at least
transparent: the law does what it purports to do.  From the perspective of adjudicative
integrity, it is obviously quite a different matter when a jurisprudence is not merely un-
moved by the brutal consequences of its stated terms but instead skews or misrepresents
the terms themselves to prejudice a particular class of disfavored litigants.  This reaches
beyond class indifference to the question of veiled bias and the subconstitutional status
of the American poor.  The articulation and enforcement of fundamental rights so as
to withhold from the poor the full force of generally applicable guarantees is not merely
an offense to the indigent but to the core legitimating principle of American constitu-
tionalism: that the “equality of formal rights” will be “scrupulously maintained.”69
64 Frank Michelman, Economic Power and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
at 45, 52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009).
65 Nice, Forty Years, supra note 61, at 9; cf. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change
(or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
27 (2005).
66 See Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at 662–63; Nice, Forty Years, supra note 61, at 9
(“Poor people seem trapped in a perpetual stalemate: without rights, no politics and without
politics, no rights.”).
67 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 319–24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986,
at C2 (“[T]he moral precepts of distributive justice . . . surely fall within the broad middle range
of moral values that may be embodied in law but need not be.”).
68 Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 112.
69 Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1358.
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For several decades, scholars writing in areas across the rights spectrum have
drawn attention to the veiled subordination of the poor through the enforcement of
purportedly neutral doctrine.70  Without attempting to classify the diverse manifesta-
tions of this bias, it is useful to distinguish generally between two particular ways in
which the subordinating process plays out.  First, the articulation of certain constitu-
tional doctrines itself embeds socioeconomic bias.71  In such cases, the law is enforced
on its stated terms but the terms themselves skew constitutional enforcement against
the interests of the poor.72  Second, and most threatening to the claim of legitimate
adjudication, are instances where the judiciary subordinates the rights of the poor by
simply ignoring or grossly misrepresenting the articulated doctrine itself.73  Both of
these processes are relevant to the poor’s inferior relationship with the Fourth Amend-
ment’s privacy right.74
There are two dimensions of protected privacy under the Fourth Amendment, each
reflecting a different aspect of enforcement bias.  First, the articulated doctrine protects
what the Supreme Court characterizes as “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy.”75  This
formulation embeds socioeconomic bias in the terms of the doctrine itself insofar as the
construction of “reasonableness” reflects a particular set of social arrangements and
assumptions that largely excludes the experience of the American poor.76  Second, and
70 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invading
Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden
Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing “dual system” of constitutional enforcement in the
context of substantive due process rights); McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1057; Nice, No Scrutiny,
supra note 7, at 650–55; Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System Of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) (Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900
(1964) (Part II), and 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) (Part III).
71 The doctrine of formal indifference also implicates socioeconomic bias insofar as it
ignores the practical impossibility of exercising certain fundamental rights without material
resources. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. In that respect, however, the doctrine
discriminates against the poor in its secondary effect, as the enforced law interacts with the
underlying material conditions of poverty; its enforcement in the first instance is class-
neutral. In contrast, the discriminatory impact discussed here is a primary effect the doctrine:
the law directly differentiates based on class and distributes its protections unequally in its
immediate application.
72 See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1043–57; infra Part I.B.1.
73 See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385–403; infra Part I.B.2.
74 See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385–403; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009); Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at
652–55; Slobogin, supra note 13, at 392; William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment
Privacy]; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1822–24
(1998) [hereinafter Race, Class, and Drugs].
75 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
76 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 798 (2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution].
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at its textual core,77 the Fourth Amendment protects certain uniquely inviolable physical
spaces per se—in particular, the home78 and the person.79  In decisions that barely
attempt to reconcile with prevailing authority, the courts have simply refused to
safeguard the poor when facing intrusions upon these uniquely protected interests.80 
We consider each of these dimensions of the privacy right in turn.
1. Bias Embedded in the Privacy Doctrine
The discriminatory effect of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “reasonable
expectations of privacy” is rooted in the formulation itself.  The concept of reason-
ableness is irreducibly subjective; what may seem to be a reasonable expectation of
privacy to an indigent resident of a crowded tenement may seem entirely unreason-
able to an affluent member of the federal bench.  The Court attempts to address this
problem by declaring broadly that the relevant measure of reasonableness is the judg-
ment of “society” generally.81  But there is no isolable “society” in a nation as diverse
and divided as ours.82  Necessarily, then, the Court must choose among competing per-
spectives and experiences to resolve the reasonableness inquiry.  As Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the Court predictably chooses its own:
There’s been much talk about diversity on the bench, but there’s
one kind of diversity that doesn’t exist: No truly poor people are
appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter. 
Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the
class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos.  The
everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not close
77 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons [and]
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
78 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); see, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972).
79 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966); cf. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.”).
80 See infra Part I.B.2 & Part II.D.3.
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Morgan
Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV.
199, 250 (1993) (“[B]y asking whether the expectation in dispute is one society is willing to rec-
ognize as reasonable, the test’s second prong implicitly encourages decisionmakers to define fun-
damental constitutional values by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes.”).
82 See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 158–61 (Touchstone 1997)
(1962).
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to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we and our
friends live.83
Thus the Court, in giving specific content to the category of reasonable privacy ex-
pectations, relies on a set of assumptions about prevailing social norms and arrange-
ments that bears little relationship to the lives of the poor.84  In particular, the Court
links the reasonableness of privacy expectations to “the existence of ‘effective’ barriers
to intrusion”85 upon occupied space itself—a consideration that largely overlaps with
the exercise of private property rights.86  In spaces where one exercises no power to bar
intrusions—the underside of a bridge, for example, or a park bench—the doctrine
accordingly offers negligible protection.87  Obviously this concept of reasonableness
works well for those who can retreat to the private confines of their homes, offices, or
judicial chambers, but it leaves very little protected privacy for individuals without a
home or who share their physical space with others.88
Most of the American poor are not homeless, however, and have some private
space to call their own.89  Nevertheless, their ability to utilize that space for private
purposes is still differentially burdened by the reality that “the homes of the rich are
larger and more comfortable, making it possible to live a larger portion of life in them. 
Privacy follows space, and people with money have more space than people without.”90 
With relatively less access to private space, the poor spend a greater proportion of their
lives in available common space—such as parks, playgrounds, sidewalks, and streets—
83 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc review).
84 See, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 76, at 798; Stuntz, Race, Class, and
Drugs, supra note 74, at 1823–24 (“Existing social arrangements define the Fourth Amendment
baseline. This proposition has large distributive consequences, for people with money enjoy
more privacy than people without.”).
85 Slobogin, supra note 13, at 401.
86 See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
en banc rehearing) (“The very rich [are] able to protect their privacy with the aid of electric
gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols . . . .”);
cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power
to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s
bundle of property rights.”).
87 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see Slobogin, supra note
13, at 401.
88 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 541–42 & nn.94–95 (1978); Slobogin, supra note
13, at 401; Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1266.
89 Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for the
Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003) (noting that between five and ten percent of
the poor experience homelessness in a given year).
90 Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1270.
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where Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes only limited privacy expectations.91 
Necessarily then, the articulated doctrine, while neutral on its face, cuts powerfully
against the poor in its direct application.92
Speaking directly to his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge Kozinski
recently decried this “unselfconscious cultural elitism”93 in a case upholding the ability
of police to surreptitiously attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car parked
in the driveway of a modest home:
[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all
the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it. . . .  When you glide
your BMW into your underground garage or behind an electric
gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a track-
ing device to it while you sleep.  But the Constitution doesn’t
prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his
trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man
whose urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol.94
2. Bias Enforced on the Privacy Doctrine
The second dimension of protected privacy relates to the first but predates and
subsumes it.  Historically, the Fourth Amendment privacy right has reserved its highest
protection for certain textually-specified spaces—most prominently, the home and the
person.95  While the Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
91 See id. at 1271–72.
92 This embedded bias is evident in other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine as well. For
example, in establishing the “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing required to justify a search
or seizure, the Supreme Court has identified two factors that embed profound class bias. First,
the Court has held that mere presence in a “high-crime area” independently contributes to sus-
pected wrongdoing. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972). This consideration applies in practice almost exclusively to poor
urban neighborhoods with high rates of street crime, thus placing an innocent poor person at
objectively greater risk of a permissible search than an identically situated individual in an
affluent community. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Rea-
sonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605–06 (2008); Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137–38 (1999). This bias is exacerbated
by the Court’s identification of “evasive” behavior as an additional factor contributing to rea-
sonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Given that “contact with the police can itself
be dangerous” for the urban poor, “unprovoked flight [by an innocent person] is neither ‘ab-
errant’ nor ‘abnormal.’” Id. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing).
94 Id.
95 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
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places,”96 when it announced the reasonable expectation standard in 1967, it has sub-
sequently and repeatedly underscored the singular protections afforded the home and
the person without first filtering its analysis through the lens of reasonable expecta-
tions.97  This reflects the indisputably protected status of these intimate spaces; it is
axiomatic that individuals possess the highest expectation of privacy within their
dwellings and with respect to their bodies, and the doctrine takes that premise as a
starting point.98
Nevertheless, the federal courts have withheld from the poor the full reach of these
doctrinally unambiguous protections as well.  In the absence of any credible basis to
subordinate the interests of the poor in this respect, the courts have simply ignored or
distorted otherwise applicable authority.99  This doctrinal subterfuge has played out
primarily in the context of the poor’s privacy within the home—the location of the
Fourth Amendment’s “ultimate protection.”100  The long tradition of respecting the
sanctity of the home101 follows an equally long tradition of excluding the indigent from
the full reach of that protection,102 and the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the
intermediate appellate courts reflect the disjuncture.103
The Supreme Court spoke directly to the poor’s domestic privacy rights in its 1971
decision in Wyman v. James,104 which addressed the constitutionality of mandatory
home visits conducted by welfare caseworkers.105  In upholding the practice, Wyman
departed from Fourth Amendment doctrine in two significant respects.  First, the Court
concluded that the visits were not “searches” at all within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—and thus were not subject to constitutional review—because of their
96 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
97 Regarding the home, see, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Regarding the body, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303 (1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968).
98 Id.; see, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[A] person’s body and home [are] areas afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection.”); cf. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 847–56 (1999);
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912 (2010).
99 See infra notes 104–55 and accompanying text.
100 United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).
101 See Budd, supra note 10, at 359–63.
102 Id. at 363–68.
103 The one contemporary appellate opinion addressing the poor’s parallel right of bodily
privacy disparaged that interest as well but was reversed by an equally divided en banc court.
Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x
601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). That decision, addressing the permissibility of mandatory drug
testing as a condition of public assistance, is discussed in detail in Part II.D.3.
104 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
105 Id. at 310.
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predominantly rehabilitative (as opposed to investigatory) character and the fact that
they purportedly occurred by consent.106  This conclusion defied otherwise applicable
authority establishing that the presence or absence of criminal consequences has no
bearing on whether an intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,107 and that
consent, if any, serves not to eliminate a search but to validate it.108  Accordingly, the
Court was “unquestionably incorrect in its assertion that a home visit is not a search.”109
The second rationale offered in Wyman was equally suspect.  Assuming arguendo
that home visits fell within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court offered an
“ad hoc”110 list of reasons why the suspicionless and warrantless searches were nonethe-
less reasonable.111  The enumerated factors—including the non-criminal nature of the
visit, the friendly attitude of the caseworkers, and the state’s interests in fiscal integrity
and the welfare of poor children112—offered virtually no doctrinal support for the con-
clusion that the visits constituted a permissible entry in the absence of a warrant or sus-
picion.113  Wyman thus stood in obvious conflict with the surrounding body of Fourth
Amendment law, and the “glaring inconsistency” was not lost on the lower courts.114 
As Christopher Slobogin notes, its analysis is coherent only “on the ground that the
homes of people on welfare get less Fourth Amendment protection.”115
Wyman, however, was limited in its scope.  The Court stressed that its conclusions
turned upon the rehabilitative116 and non-invasive117 nature of the visit, which in the
Court’s estimation more closely approximated an interaction with “a friend to one in
need” than an adversarial encounter with the state.118  Whether or not one accepts that
characterization,119 the analysis clearly does not extend to endorse highly invasive in-
vestigative intrusions by law enforcement officers for the sole purpose of uncovering
106 Id. at 317–18.
107 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967).
108 Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
109 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 10.3(a) (4th ed. 2004).
110 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 318–26 (majority opinion).
112 Id.
113 See Budd, supra note 10, at 369–73.
114 Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (D. Minn. 1979); see, e.g., Blackwelder v.
Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 140–41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
115 Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403.
116 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317, 319–21, 323; see Budd, supra note 10, at 386–87.
117 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 321; see Budd, supra note 10, at 393–94.
118 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323; see Gustafson, supra note 74, at 700.
119 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reason-
ableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1720–22 (1998); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty:
Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. J. 1499, 1522–25 (1991).
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evidence of ineligibility or fraud.120  However, those are precisely the practices that the
intermediate courts have recently read Wyman to sanction.121
In the wake of federal welfare-reform legislation devolving administrative authority
for public assistance to state and local governments,122 many jurisdictions have utilized
their new discretion to impose exceptionally harsh verification procedures on aid appli-
cants and recipients.123  Among the requirements is an updated variant of the Wyman
home visit that lacks virtually all of its moderating characteristics.124  The prototype for
these new home visits is San Diego County’s “Project 100%,” which employs investi-
gative practices that are among “the most aggressive in the country.”125  As a condition
of public assistance, all aid applicants in the county must agree to an unscheduled home
visit by a sworn law-enforcement investigator from the District Attorney’s Public Assis-
tance Fraud Division.126  Refusal to permit the visit or to accept the scope of the investi-
gator’s inspection results in the denial of benefits.127  The visit itself is exclusively
for investigatory purposes and has no rehabilitative component.128  Once in the home,
the investigator’s discretion is unlimited and any area of the home is subject to inspec-
tion.129  Investigators accordingly rifle through dresser drawers, medicine cabinets,
closets, and refrigerators,130 all in search of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.131
120 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Budd, supra note 10, at 386–95.
121 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918–19, 923–25 (9th Cir. 2006); S.L. v.
Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1306–11 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14 (Ct. App. 2002).
122 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1145–86 (2000); William P. Quigley, Backwards into
the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle
Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102 (1998).
123 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of
Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
663, 674–78 (2005).
124 See Budd, supra note 10, at 379–85.
125 Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
126 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918–20; Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 2003 WL 25655642,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 10, 2003), aff’d, 464 F.3d 916.
127 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2.
128 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; see id. at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
129 Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 (“[N]o specific protocol limits where the inves-
tigator may look . . . .”).
130 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; id. at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
131 Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2, *8 n.8; Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at
9–10, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122), 2004 WL 1949000, at *23–25.
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In Sanchez v. County of San Diego,132 the Ninth Circuit relied on the “radically
different”133 facts of Wyman as controlling authority for the conclusion that Project
100% does not even implicate the Fourth Amendment search doctrine134—or, in the
alternative, that its practices are a reasonable exercise of the search power in the absence
of suspicion or a warrant.135  Other courts have reached the same holding on similar
facts.136  To equate Wyman’s friendly visit with an adversarial search by sworn fraud
investigators, however, defies any plausible comparison.137  As seven circuit judges
noted in their dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Sanchez, “The differences
between San Diego’s program and the program in Wyman are of a quality and char-
acter that cannot be ignored. . . .  [T]he simple fact of the matter is that a home visit in
Sanchez is fundamentally different from a home visit in Wyman.”138
There is a second reason why Wyman cannot support these contemporary search
practices: it no longer states the relevant Fourth Amendment standard for the intrusions
at issue.139  Idiosyncratic from the start, Wyman was long ago superseded by the special-
needs doctrine as the appropriate analytic framework within which to assess warrantless
and suspicionless searches for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.140  Under the
special-needs analysis, courts engage in a reasonableness calculation that directly bal-
ances the magnitude of the threatened privacy loss against the weight of the state’s
countervailing interest in the search at issue.141  Under prevailing authority, this bal-
ancing calculation cannot possibly authorize the practices at issue in San Diego and
related jurisdictions.142  On one side of the equation is a privacy interest of the highest
order—the sanctity of the home itself.143  On the other side of the equation is an entirely
pedestrian administrative objective—the state’s general interest in the fiscal integrity
132 464 F.3d 916. Before joining the faculty of University of New Hampshire School of Law,
the author served as Legal Director of the ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties
and in that capacity represented the plaintiff class in Sanchez.
133 Id. at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 921 (“Wyman directly controls the instant case.”).
135 See id. at 923–25.
136 S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We are bound by Wyman”); see
also id. at 1306–11; cf. Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14
(Ct. App. 2002).
137 See Budd, supra note 10, at 386–95.
138 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
139 See, e.g., Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922 n.8.
140 See generally Budd, supra note 10, at 395–97; Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special
Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference
Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997).
141 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
142 See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D.1.
143 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
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of a benefits program144—that falls well outside the relatively narrow range of public
safety145 and in loco parentis146 concerns that the Court has recognized as sufficient to
justify a special needs search.147
In the face of this doctrinal impediment, the Ninth Circuit simply distorted both
sides of the analytic equation.148  As to the privacy interest at stake, the Sanchez court
explicitly equated welfare recipients with convicted felons to establish the proposition
that the poor have a diminished expectation of privacy within their homes—citing as
controlling authority a case that permits a state’s penal authorities to search the home
of a probationer without a warrant.149  Taking a slightly different tack, other courts have
returned to Wyman as authority for some generalized diminution in the expectation of
privacy of all welfare recipients, simply by virtue of their receipt of a public benefit.150 
Stating the obvious but to no avail, the dissenting judge in Sanchez reminded his col-
leagues that “unlike convicted felons, welfare applicants have no lesser expectation of
privacy in their homes than the rest of us.”151
On the other side of the equation, Sanchez and related cases have declared that the
state’s pedestrian fiscal interests are sufficient to support the intrusions at issue, despite
the absence of any special-needs authority to support the assertion, and have notably
failed to acknowledge the broader consequences of their reasoning.152  If the state may
search the home of any recipient of a public benefit merely to verify compliance with
administrative requirements, the search power is essentially unlimited in its application
to the general population—since it is exceedingly difficult to find anyone who is not
a recipient of some public benefit, subsidy, credit, or deduction that depends in part
on representations about conditions within one’s home.153  Of course, the prospect of
144 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc review).
145 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989); Skinner, 489
U.S. at 634; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”); Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).
146 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836–37; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–57
(1995).
147 See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (referring to the “closely guarded category of consti-
tutionally permissible suspicionless searches”).
148 See Budd, supra note 10, at 397–403.
149 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73 (1987)).
150 S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995); Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Super-
visors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002).
151 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 940 (Fisher, J., dissenting); see Gustafson, supra note 74, at 708.
152 See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 926; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1310; Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
153 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sanchez,
464 F.3d at 941 n.12 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403 (“Those
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the federal courts authorizing such a sweeping expansion of the search power is non-
existent as a practical and jurisprudential matter,154 and it is beside the point to worry
about the possibility.  Sanchez and related authorities do not threaten the broader secu-
rity of Americans in their homes; they instead demonstrate that the poor stand alone,
beneath those protections, and face unique intrusions based on rationales that apply to
no one else.155
3. Rationalizing Bias: Poverty as a Proxy for Cause
Unusual in several respects, these cases are notable in particular for the degree to
which they overtly mischaracterize controlling authority.  This is not the way courts
typically go about their business,156 however politicized one believes them to be,157 and
the holdings raise obvious questions regarding subjective motivation and intent.  At
one end of the explanatory spectrum is simple malice—the possibility that the decisions
arise from unvarnished class animus.  Innumerable intermediate possibilities range
forward from that point, involving various shades and degrees of cognitive dissonance,
objectification, paternalism, and the like.158  At the far end of the spectrum is the pos-
sibility that the judges have no subjective sense whatsoever of how far outside the pa-
rameters of conventional adjudication these cases fall.159
suspected of tax fraud get full Fourth Amendment protection; those suspected of welfare fraud
get none.”); Note, Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent
to Suspicionless Home Visits—Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996,
2003 (2007).
154 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (observing that the
Fourth Amendment must be construed to prohibit suspicionless intrusions “from becoming
a routine part of American life.”).
155 See Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of
en banc review).
156 Cf. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96
VA. L. REV. 719, 758–60 (2010).
157 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17–57, 147–50 (2006).
158 Cf. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making,
77 UMKC L. REV. 347, 374 (2008) (“[J]udges’ subjective motivations can only explain a part
what is going on in their decisions. Human beings are often, and perhaps mostly, unaware of
why they hold particular beliefs or choose certain courses of action.”).
159 Id. at 375 (“Thus, even if judges subjectively experience their decision-making as an
attempt to reach the most coherent, logical reading of the relevant legal authorities, their own
perceptions generally misapprehend much of what actually determines their behavior. The judges
themselves can only see a part of what moves them. No matter what they write in their opinions,
or how much they might protest to the contrary, there is much more to their choices than the ob-
jective interpretation of law. Forces external to the law and outside the judges’ cognition shade
their interpretations of texts and precedent and frame their readings of history and tradition.”
(footnote omitted)).
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The complexity of the question is confounding, to say the least, and any effort to
address it would be an ambitious project of its own.  There is, however, a related and
more modest inquiry that sheds some light on the internal logic of these decisions. 
Presuming a judge were interested in rationalizing the outcomes as the product of
legitimate adjudication, any explanation would necessarily require some articulation
with the values of the Fourth Amendment itself.  The narrower question, then, is how
might the wholesale suspension of the poor’s domestic privacy rights be articulated
with those values—and, in particular, the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on individ-
ualized suspicion?160
A possible answer begins with the broader societal conception of the poor that con-
textualizes the decisions.  As the literature exhaustively documents, the “able-bodied”
poor have been demonized for centuries as indolent, immoral, and intrinsically predis-
posed to their predicament.161  This caricature traces back to the colonial era162 and has
played a central role in shaping the contemporary American ideology of class.163  Most
recently, the stereotypical account of the poor—and, more specifically, of welfare re-
cipients—has taken the form of the mythical “welfare queen”164 or “welfare mother”165
whose imagined exploits continue to shape the public debate surrounding issues of
socioeconomic justice.166  Reinforcing this longstanding caricature has been the in-
creasing isolation and residential segregation of poor Americans, who are now largely
invisible to broader society.167  As the lives of the poor become more divorced from
the experience of others, the dehumanizing and reductionist force of the caricature
160 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
161 See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN 144–45 (1988); Budd,
supra note 10, at 363–65; Gustafson, supra note 74, at 648–55; Quigley, supra note 122, at
105–06; William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States,
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 114 (1997) [hereinafter Reluctant Charity]; Ross, supra note 119, at
1502–08; see generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
162 See Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 211, 221–22 (2003).
163 See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 74–102 (1995); Ross, supra
note 119, at 1502–08.
164 See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The World After Katrina: Eyes Wide Shut?, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2007); Gustafson, supra note 74, at 655–58; April Land, Children
in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal Constitutional Protections in the Wake of Welfare
“Reforms,” 2000 UTAH L. REV. 779, 811.
165 Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 167, 172 (2002).
166 See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658–64; Ross, supra note 165, at 172.
167 See, e.g., HARRINGTON, supra note 82, at 2–7; Debra Lyn Bassett, Distancing Rural
Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 3, 13 (2006) (“[P]overty is literally out of sight as
well as out of mind.”); David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclass in its Place: Zoning, the Poor,
and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. LAW. 787, 788 (2009) (“[C]ontemporary American metro-
politan areas remain overwhelmingly segregated by socioeconomic class.”).
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correspondingly increases168—and the strengthening caricature, in turn, further inten-
sifies the isolation of the poor.169  Over time, the individual fades into the encom-
passing myth.
So objectified, welfare recipients as a class are understood to possess character-
istics that evoke the reasonable suspicion and disdain of broader society.  As Kaaryn
Gustafson has recently documented, these imputed qualities increasingly correspond
not merely with poverty but with criminality as well.170  She notes that “welfare appli-
cants are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves,”171 and that federal and
state welfare laws increasingly “assume[] a latent criminality among the poor.”172 
Consistent with these assumptions, contemporary state and federal welfare policy is
punitive, adversarial, and distrustful.173  Surveillance, sanctions, and verification “ex-
tremism” are now prominent characteristics of welfare administration,174 all with the
intended purpose of reducing the total number of individuals receiving relief175—either
by blocking entry to the programs at the front end176 or by terminating benefits as
quickly as possible.177  Thus it comes as no surprise that the number of individuals
receiving federal welfare assistance has dropped precipitously178 as the poverty rate
escalates.179  These outcomes coincide with the archaic notion that the immorality of
the poor is the ultimate cause of their plight and that the state’s capacity and respon-
sibility to ameliorate poverty is limited as a result.180
This conception of the indigent influences judicial perceptions as well.181  As
Thomas Ross notes, “When judges construct their arguments, they must depend on
168 See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional
Law Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1247 (2007) (“This socially constructed otherness
of the poor is reinforced by (or perhaps serves as justification for) the social and spatial
isolation of low-income families in economically segregated neighborhoods and inferior
public schools.”).
169 See Ross, supra note 119, at 1503 (“[The poor] have been cast as different, deviant,
and morally weak. These assumptions make coherent the physical separation of the poor from
the affluent.” (footnote omitted)).
170 Gustafson, supra note 74, at 665–66; see also CYNTHIA A. BRIGGS & JENNIFER L.
PEPPERELL, WOMEN, GIRLS, AND ADDICTION 126 (2009).
171 Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
172 Id. at 647.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 646; Mulzer, supra note 123, at 674–78.
175 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)–(b) (2006); Diller, supra note 122, at 1178–84.
176 See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 40 (2001).
177 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 122, at 1171, 1184.
178 See id. at 1123; Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 741 & n.85 (2005); Land, supra
note 164, at 818.
179 See Rank, supra note 61, at 170–76.
180 See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 125–26.
181 See, e.g., id. at 126; Budd, supra note 10, at 403–06; Ross, supra note 119, at 1513–38.
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assumptions widely shared by their audience.  Judges depend on these assumptions
both because they give their arguments power and the potential for influence, and be-
cause the judges, as members of the culture, are likely to believe them.”182  The Fourth
Amendment’s skewed application to the poor occurs against the backdrop of such as-
sumptions, and considering the law in that broader context suggests a rough logic to
the judicial bias.  If welfare recipients are understood in the collective (sub)con-
sciousness as a malingering class of “liars, cheaters, and thieves,”183 it is then only a
small step to the conclusion that each among them merits suspicion by virtue of that
status.  In this sense, the outcomes in Wyman, Sanchez and related cases begin to align
on some visceral level with the Fourth Amendment’s normative allocation of privacy. 
Quite simply, poverty serves as a proxy for cause, relieving the state of the obligation
to establish individualized suspicion when it seeks to search the homes—and perhaps
the bodies—of the intrinsically culpable poor.
To suggest that the popular conception of welfare recipients aligns with their
exclusion from specific Fourth Amendment protections is not to say that any judge
has purposively reasoned from one to the next.  But it does imply that the deep and
wounding myth of the immoral poor has particular resonance for a doctrine that turns
on subjective judgments about the “reasonableness” of the state’s suspicions.  As
part of the context within which those judgments have been made, the caricature of
the poor may well have exerted some influence over the judiciary’s decision to classify
welfare recipients as a presumptively suspect class—whether or not the courts con-
sciously acknowledge the connection.184
II. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
The poor’s exercise of Fourth Amendment privacy rights remains under siege. 
Having authorized government to search the homes of welfare recipients without indi-
vidualized suspicion or a warrant, the courts may soon be asked whether the bodies
of aid recipients are subject to similar intrusions.  Over the last three years, proposals
to drug-test welfare recipients have emerged as a significant legislative trend across
the country.185  Introduced in just a few legislatures in 2007, drug testing legislation
appeared in over half of the states by 2009.186  The bills have garnered increasingly sub-
stantial support, with some having passed at least one legislative chamber.187  Recently
182 Ross, supra note 119, at 1513.
183 Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
184 See supra notes 158–59.
185 See infra Part II.C.
186 See infra notes 284 & 287.
187 See, e.g., Tom Breen, Some States, Including Minn., Move Toward Drug Tests For Wel-
fare Recipients, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.startribune
.com/politics/state/41904442.html?elr=KArks:DCiUMcyaL_nDaycUiacyKUUr; Terry Ganey,
Senate Keeps Welfare Drug-Testing Item From Advancing, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Columbia,
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members of Congress have joined the effort and introduced legislation requiring all
states to test recipients of federally-funded public assistance.188  While very little
attention has yet focused on this emerging development, it may soon present the
judiciary with an important occasion to revisit its treatment of the poor’s right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  Involving suspicionless intrusions into one of
the two spheres of privacy at the apex of constitutional sanctity—the body it-
self—the proposals, if enacted, will require the courts to decide between two starkly
different visions of the privacy right.
A. Prelude: Federal Welfare Reform
The recent surge in mandatory drug testing proposals traces back to a provision
of federal welfare reform passed in 1996.189  Among a vast array of punitive provisions
that fundamentally altered the nature of federal public assistance,190 the legislation ex-
pressly authorizes individual states to impose drug testing as a condition of aid: “Not-
withstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be prohibited by the Federal
Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from
sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances . . . .”191 
This provision is one of several that address drug use among welfare recipients,
including a related measure that permits states to impose a lifetime ban on aid to indi-
viduals who have been convicted of certain drug-related offenses.192
1. The Premise of the Addicted Poor
The legislative debates attending the passage of the federal statute made clear that
its proponents fully embraced the disparaging caricature of the American poor as well
as the corollary proposition that state aid only exacerbates the problem.  In justifying
the legislation, a parade of representatives took to the floor to recite a litany of charges
Mo.), May 14, 2009, http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/may/14/senate-keeps-welfare
-drug-testing-item-from/; Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking
Drug Testing to Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_re
leases/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html; S. Minutes, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. Feb. 11, 2008).
188 Drug Free Families Act of 2009, S. 97, 111th Cong. § 2; Press Release, Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Hatch Introduces Amendment Requiring Drug Testing for Welfare, Unemployment
Benefits (June 15, 2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases
.Detail&PressRelease_id=3d3e1ab4-1b78-be3e-e099-95c71cb7495e&Month=6&Year=2010.
189 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
190 See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658–78.
191 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2009).
192 Id. § 862a(a). PRWORA also authorized substance abuse treatment as part of “an indi-
vidual responsibility plan” for welfare recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2)(A).
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against the “welfare system”193 and its recipient population.  Speakers alleged that wel-
fare teaches people “to depend on it and not to be able to depend on themselves,”194
“discourages thrift, discourages work, separates . . . and destroys families, isolates
children, and from an early age, stifles their ambition,”195 creates an environment that
“is not . . . morally healthy,”196 and “fosters poverty, despair, hopelessness, and il-
legitimacy.”197  Others asserted that “the Federal Government is completely incapa-
ble of helping these people”198 and that welfare instead constitutes “federally funded
child abuse.”199
Allegations of criminal behavior and drug abuse among welfare recipients were
high on the list of rationales recited in support of the bill.200  Representatives declared
that “[t]he high crime rates, the high drug abuse rates . . . are very, very closely linked
to our welfare system,”201 while others decried “the destructive practice of giving . . .
benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, blighting their lives at great public expense.”202 
Poor children, whose “ideologues and . . . role models are pimps and drug dealers,”203
were depicted as “selling drugs . . . [and] killing each other.”204  It was, in short, a world
of “skyrocket[ing]”205 crime, illegitimacy, “fraud, and abuse,”206 and Congress had a
“very straightforward” message in response: “No more money for nothing. . . . [G]et
a real job.”207
While empirical data regarding drug abuse among the poor played little part in the
hyperbolic political debate,208 it is noteworthy that the correlation between poverty and
drug addiction is quite weak.  Researchers analyzing data from the National Longitudi-
nal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey—described by the National Institutes of Health as
the “‘gold standard’ for estimating the prevalence of adult alcohol and other drug dis-
orders”209—concluded in 1996 that “[p]roportions of welfare recipients using, abusing,
193 142 CONG. REC. 17674 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign).
194 Id. at 17603 (statement of Rep. Kasich).
195 Id. at 17677 (statement of Rep. Traficant).
196 Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
197 Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
198 Id. at 17618 (statement of Rep. Weldon).
199 Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
200 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 4 (1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 490
(1996) (Conf. Rep.).
201 142 CONG. REC. 17618 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
202 Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. English); see, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Ensign) (“Should
we continue to give cash payments to prisoners and drug addicts?”).
203 Id. at 17614 (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
204 Id. at 17683 (statement of Rep. Shays).
205 Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
206 Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
207 Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
208 See generally supra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
209 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAAA Re-
searchers Estimate Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients
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or dependent on alcohol or illicit drugs are consistent with proportions of both the adult
U.S. population and adults who do not receive welfare.”210  The researchers found that
the rate of alcohol abuse and/or dependence among welfare recipients ranged from 4.3
to 8.2 percent across five welfare programs, compared to a rate of 7.4 among the gen-
eral population,211 while the rate of drug abuse and/or dependence among welfare
recipients ranged between 1.3 and 3.6 percent in comparison to a rate of 1.5 percent
among the broader population.212  Data from the National Household Survey of Drug
Abuse roughly coincides with these findings, with a rate of drug dependence among
welfare recipients in 1994 and 1995 of approximately four percent and a rate of alcohol
dependence of nine percent.213  Perhaps most notably, the data suggests that no more
than one in five welfare recipients uses an illicit drug in any given year—and half of
those individuals use marijuana alone.214  The depiction of aid recipients as welfare-
enabled drug addicts and the resulting statutory provisions authorizing drug testing
and related sanctions thus bear little relation to the actual lives of the American poor.
Finally, even if poverty did correlate with significantly higher rates of drug abuse
and addiction, the question of causation would remain: does the harsh reality of poverty
lead to drug use, or do reckless choices by individuals lead to addiction and then to
poverty as a secondary effect?215  The answer obviously bears on the punitive rationality
of get-tough proposals denying assistance to impoverished applicants who test positive
for illicit drug use.  There are “surprisingly few studies”216 that have examined this re-
lationship, and what little research exists suggests that there “is not a direct, causal rela-
tionship between the two social problems, but instead one which is mitigated by a range
of complex factors, including characteristics of the agent (e.g., alcohol), of the person
(e.g., coping style), and of the environment (e.g., availability of substances, family
structure, lack of job opportunities).”217  Rather than grapple with this complexity and
factual uncertainty, federal welfare policy simply posits the politically expedient myth
that drug abuse among welfare recipients is a volitional choice reflecting a punishable
moral failure.218  To the extent that the policy thus denies assistance to debilitated
(Oct. 23, 1996), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/newsevents/newsreleases/pages
/welfare.aspx.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 RUKMALIE JAYAKODY ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WELFARE REFORM 2 (Nat’l
Poverty Ctr., Policy Brief Ser. No. 2, Apr. 2004), available at http://www.npc.umich.edu/pub
lications/policy_briefs/brief02/brief2.pdf.
214 Id.
215 See, e.g., Nancy J. Smyth & Kathleen A. Kost, Exploring the Nature of the Relationship
Between Poverty and Substance Abuse: Knowns and Unknowns, 1 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T
67 (1998).
216 Id. at 78.
217 Id.
218 See supra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
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applicants whose drug use is enmeshed with the trauma of poverty, it simply exacer-
bates their misfortune.219
2. The Premise of State Dominion
Just as the 1996 federal legislation posits a caricature of the addicted poor, so too
it rests on a longstanding conception of the state’s dominion over the private lives of
welfare recipients.  For centuries, the assistance of the state has come at the sacrifice
of personal autonomy.220  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, those
in need of public assistance were regularly auctioned off or indentured as laborers,
barred from moving to new communities, and functionally imprisoned in poor-
houses.221  The process extended to children as well, whose labor could be auctioned
to pay a parent’s debts.222  In the early twentieth century, officials continued to closely
regulate the intimate lives of aid recipients—raiding their homes at night to search for
male visitors,223 barring evening dates for women receiving assistance,224 and mandating
religious instruction for dependent children.225  Investigators assessed the “suitability”
of applicants and denied aid based on “use of tobacco, lack of church attendance, dis-
honesty, drunkenness, housing a male lodger, extramarital relations, poor discipline,
criminal behavior, child delinquency, and overt child neglect.  Agencies even forced
families to move from neighborhoods with questionable reputations.”226  Some of these
practices continued through the 1950s and 1960s, including most notably the use of
surprise midnight raids in search of male guests.227
This tradition of intrusion has extended to the bodily autonomy of welfare recipi-
ents, as several scholars have observed in the context of reproductive choice.228  In the
last twenty years, policymakers have considered a long list of measures linking the level
and availability of welfare benefits to marital status,229 limitations on childbearing,230
219 See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack et al., Substance Use Among Welfare Recipients: Trends and
Policy Responses, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 256, 261 (2002).
220 See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 22–24.
221 See id. at 23–24; Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 161, at 140–75.
222 See Burkhart, supra note 162, at 223.
223 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 175, 208–09 (2002).
224 See id. at 222–23.
225 See GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 25.
226 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 161, at 202.
227 See id. at 324–25; GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 31–32.
228 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
229 See Williams, supra note 228, at 720.
230 See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Dam-
aging Consequences, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 152–54 (2006).
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the use of contraception,231 and even “the sterilization of women on welfare as a con-
dition of receiving benefits.”232  As Lucie White observes, “these kinds of ‘welfare
reform’ provisions [relate] back to this country’s long history of targeting the repro-
ductive autonomy of poor women, particularly women of color.  The powerful have
repeatedly marshalled state power to use the bodies of poor women to further their
own economic and symbolic ends.”233  Federal legislation permitting states to physically
intrude upon the bodies of welfare recipients for purposes of invasive extraction pro-
cedures continues quite literally in this incursive tradition.
3. The Irrelevance of Efficacy
Among the most striking aspects of the push for suspicionless drug testing, and
a telling indication that it has little to do with ordinary public policy concerns, is its
inefficacy in achieving any of the purported objectives associated with the procedure. 
Drug testing is variously touted as a means of encouraging welfare recipients to
overcome substance abuse as a barrier to employment,234 stopping drug-related child
abuse,235 and removing government from the business of subsidizing drug addiction.236 
All of these objectives rest, in part, on the unfounded premise that drug abuse is a sig-
nificantly greater concern among the poor than in the general population.237  Putting
aside that assumption, however, the use of punitive drug testing to address issues sur-
rounding drug abuse is a highly overinclusive and ineffective means of accomplishing
any of the declared policy goals.
First, a positive drug test reflects only recent drug use, not drug abuse or impair-
ment, and is accordingly an overinclusive means of identifying drug-related dysfunc-
tion.238  Thus, “[i]f drug testing is used as a form of screening, many recipients likely
to test positive will be casual drug users who do not satisfy diagnostic criteria for
231 See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth
Amendment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401,
404–08 (2000); Williams, supra note 228, at 720.
232 Smith, supra note 230, at 163; see Lynn M. Paltrow, Why Caring Communities Must
Oppose C.R.A.C.K./Project Prevention: How C.R.A.C.K. Promotes Dangerous Propaganda
and Undermines the Health and Well Being of Children and Families, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 11, 11–12,
93 (2003) (describing program that “offers $200 for current and former drug users to get ster-
ilized or to use certain long-acting birth control methods”).
233 Lucie White, Searching for the Logic Behind Welfare Reform, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J.
427, 433–34 (1996).
234 See, e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
235 Id. at 1141.
236 See, e.g., supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text; infra notes 276–83 and accom-
panying text.
237 See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., Pollack et al., supra note 219, at 269.
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dependence.”239  Because “[w]idespread drug testing of welfare recipients will detect
use among many women who have no accompanying problem with impaired social
performance or employment,”240 it will inevitably sanction individuals for whom the
state has no cause for concern with respect to its stated objectives.
Second, drug abuse itself is not a significant contributing factor to welfare de-
pendency.  “Although [welfare] recipients have become more disadvantaged along
a number of characteristics related to health and mental health, substance abuse and
dependence is not a major contributor in defining the core group of recipients re-
maining on the rolls.”241  As noted above, the incidence of drug abuse among welfare
recipients is estimated to be no higher than four percent of the entire beneficiary popu-
lation.242  If all illicit drug use were completely eliminated among recipients, the number
of individuals in need of public assistance would decline by no more than three to
five percent.243
Finally, current drug testing methods are poorly designed to detect the types of
illicit drug use that are most likely to impair the lives of welfare recipients.  Because
drugs such as heroin and cocaine are metabolized quickly, their use is undetectable
within a few days of ingestion.244  By contrast, marijuana use is detectable for a much
longer period of time due to the fact that metabolites of the drug are fat soluble and thus
are retained in body tissue.245  The use of marijuana, however, has a less statistically
significant association with welfare receipt than even tobacco.246  Conversely, welfare
receipt is most powerfully associated with cocaine, a drug that current testing methods
regularly fail to detect.247  Compounding the poor fit is the exclusion of alcohol from
federally authorized drug testing,248 despite the fact that it is by far the most widely
abused drug among the recipient population.249
Summarizing these efficacy considerations, researchers from the University of
Michigan reached the following conclusions:
239 Id.
240 Rukmalie Jayakody et al., Welfare Reform, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health, 25
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 623, 644 (2000); see also SUSAN BOYD, MOTHERS AND ILLICIT
DRUGS: TRANSCENDING THE MYTHS 14–15 (1999).
241 JAYAKODY ET AL., supra note 213, at 3.
242 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
243 Pollack, supra note 219, at 261.
244 Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang, Examples of Specific Drug Assays, in URINE TESTING
FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 84–112 (Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph Series No.
73, 1987).
245 Id.; see LYNN ZIMMER & JOHN MORGAN, MARIJUANA MYTHS, MARIJUANA FACTS: A
REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121–22 (1997).
246 Pollack, supra note 219, at 261–62.
247 Id. at 262.
248 21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (2006) (authorizing testing for “controlled substance[s]”).
249 Bridget F. Grant & Deborah A. Dawson, Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse, and Dependence
Among Welfare Recipients, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1450, 1451–53 (1996).
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Most recipients likely to test positive are casual marijuana users
who do not satisfy DSM III-R criteria for drug-dependence.  More-
over, the benefits of drug testing must be weighed against the po-
tential misallocation of resources if positive results divert scarce
treatment slots to occasional users. . . .  Suspicionless, population-
based chemical testing of welfare recipients will detect some “true
positives” who are drug-dependent, a greater number of “accidental
positives” with complex psychological problems, and a larger
group of “false positives” who have no apparent psychiatric (in-
cluding drug-related) disorder. . . .  [C]hemical testing [also] does
not detect the large group of “false negatives” . . . who are alcohol-
dependent or who experience psychiatric disorders, but who do
not use illicit drugs.250
That Congress pressed ahead with the authorization of punitive drug testing in the face
of such serious efficacy concerns lends considerable support to the suggestion that its
purpose had less to do with crafting coherent public policy than with the symbolic
affirmation of a politically expedient stereotype.
B. The Initial Response of the States
Following passage of federal welfare reform and its invitation to the states to
impose suspicionless drug testing on welfare recipients, several states responded by
adopting more limited programs that sought to avoid the most serious constitutional
concerns associated with mandatory testing.251  Many of these ongoing programs
apply only to convicted drug felons or other individuals for whom the state has some
individualized reason to suspect drug abuse.252  Other programs apply generally to
the applicant or recipient population but rely on noninvasive screening assessments
to identify individuals for whom there is reasonable suspicion to support more invasive
drug testing.253  The State of Idaho, for example, “requires substance abuse testing of
250 Harold A. Pollack et al., Drug Testing Welfare Recipients—False Positives, False Nega-
tives, Unanticipated Opportunities, 12 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 23, 29–30 (2002).
251 This is not to suggest that the adopted measures are unobjectionable. To the contrary,
they raise serious legal and policy questions. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams,
Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-
Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006); Gustafson, supra note 74, at 672–74.
The focus here, however, is the particularly severe constitutional threat posed by suspicionless
drug testing.
252 See, e.g., 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3rd S.S., ch. 10, § 27; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:10
(2009); MINN. STAT. § 609B.435 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1 (2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-605 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 49.79(5), 49.148(4) (2009).
253 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-209j (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 1249(B)
(2009).
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any [welfare] applicant or recipient, if the [state] has a reasonable suspicion they are
engaged in, or at high risk of, substance abuse.  Testing will be conducted if screening
and assessment give a reasonable suspicion the participant is engaged in substance
abuse.”254  These programs may exist independently of or in combination with other
measures that temporarily or permanently bar the provision of aid to individuals con-
victed of certain drug-related offenses, as authorized by a separate provision of the
1996 federal statute.255
In contrast to this more limited approach, Michigan embraced the federal invitation
and enacted legislation in 1999 to impose suspicionless drug testing as a blanket con-
dition of state aid.256  Michigan’s statute called for the establishment of a pilot program
in at least three counties as a prelude to statewide testing within the following four
years.257  The program required all new applicants to submit to a drug test and addi-
tionally mandated that twenty percent of existing recipients would be randomly tested
every six months.258  The statute directed that any individual testing positive would
participate in a substance-abuse treatment program259 and that noncompliance could
trigger the termination of aid.260  In the brief period that the program operated prior to
being enjoined by a federal court,261 the state tested 258 welfare applicants of whom
only twenty-one tested positive for illicit drug use.262  Consistent with the efficacy
considerations discussed above, all but three of those positive test results were for
marijuana use alone.263
As discussed in detail in Part II.D, below, the pilot program was challenged imme-
diately and struck down by a district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit.264  The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and upheld the district court by an equally divided vote.265  The constitutional question
was thus left entirely unresolved, and the resulting ambiguity has opened the door for
254 IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.16.03.08.120 (2009).
255 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709e (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:233.2 (2009).
256 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.57l (2009).
257 Id. § 400.57l(2).
258 See Gustafson, supra note 74, at 679.
259 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.57l(3) (2009).
260 Id.; see Michael D. Socha, An Analysis of Michigan’s Plan for Suspicionless Drug Testing
of Welfare Recipients Under the Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Exception, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 1099, 1101–02 (2001).
261 See infra Part II.D.2.
262 Lisa R. Metch & Harold A. Pollack, Welfare Reform and Substance Abuse, 83 MILBANK
Q. 65, 76 (2005).
263 Id.
264 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
265 Id.
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other states to reconsider more aggressive drug testing proposals.266  Scores of such
proposals have appeared over the last three years,267 suggesting that the enactment and
implementation of another blanket testing program is a genuine threat.
C. The Legislative Groundswell
A recent survey of state legislative activity over the last three years reveals very
substantial renewed interest in aggressive drug testing of welfare applicants and re-
cipients.  Since 2007, lawmakers in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia
have proposed over sixty bills to impose testing requirements as a condition of eligi-
bility for public assistance.268  With limited exception, this body of legislation provides
broadly for ongoing suspicionless testing and embraces the entire population of public
aid beneficiaries, but omits any privacy protections or procedural safeguards.269  No-
tably, the number of aggressive drug testing bills has climbed each of the last three
years,270 corresponding with the onset of the recent financial crisis271 and consistent
with the thesis that public policy grows increasingly punitive towards the poor during
periods of economic hardship.272  Whatever the cause may be, this legislative ground-
swell has quickly emerged as an important development with serious implications for
the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of the poor.
Consistent with the legislative history of the authorizing federal statute, recent
state efforts reflect a caricaturized conception of welfare recipients273 and make no
effort to grapple with data suggesting that drug dependence among the poor is not a
significantly greater concern than it is among the general population.274  The political
rhetoric thus depicts recipients as addicts and criminals, the welfare system as a counter-
productive enabler of addiction, and drug abuse as a moral failing that drives families
into poverty.275  A state senator from Arizona captured these themes in his recent de-
fense of a drug testing bill:
There’s a moral issue here. . . .  If you’re getting taxpayer benefits,
and this isn’t money you’ve earned, you’re getting free stuff . . . . 
266 See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 22.
267 See infra note 284.
268 See infra Part II.C.1.
269 See infra Part II.C.1 & II.C.2.
270 See infra note 284.
271 MARTIN NEAL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE U.S. FINAN-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
3–5 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic
_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf.
272 See, e.g., Clark Allen Peterson, The Resurgence of Durational Residence Requirements
for the Receipt of Welfare Funds, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 305, 334 n.195 (1993).
273 See infra notes 276–83 and accompanying text.
274 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
275 See infra notes 276–83 and accompanying text.
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The minimum ought to be that you ought to not be somebody’s
[sic] that’s engaged in criminal activity. . . .  A lot of the folks that
are in desperate need are (that way) because they have a substance
abuse problem. . . .  So I’m hoping that this will drive them to get
help or at least protect the taxpayer from funding folks who need
to get their act together.276
Other state legislators describe drug testing proposals as an effort to “provide[] these
drug-addicted welfare recipients with the wake-up call they need,”277 to change “the
status quo system that enables drug addicts with taxpayer money,”278 “to prevent the
state . . . from becoming an enabler to addiction,”279 to assure that “taxpayers [do] not
have to subsidize drug abuse,”280 and to “protect[] our tax dollars from fueling drug
addictions.”281  The theme of moral failing pervades the debate: “individuals who con-
tinue to use drugs are unable to provide for their families and end up on public assis-
tance,”282 and, once there, “[t]oo often . . . take advantage of our public assistance
program and try to pocket or use their extra funds to purchase items they’re not suppose
to such as drugs.”283  Against this backdrop of moral condemnation, the rising tide of
drug testing proposals is predictably severe.
1. The Elimination of Individualized Suspicion
The most significant attribute of recent legislative proposals is the overwhelming
absence of any requirement that individualized suspicion support invasive drug testing. 
Suspicionless testing is thus a condition of aid embraced by forty-nine bills introduced
276 Drug Test for Arizona Welfare Recipients May Be Needed, DOUGLAS DISPATCH, Feb.
2, 2009, http://www.douglasdispatch.com/articles/2009/02/02/news/doc4987b79c7878776
7632585.txt (quoting Ariz. State Sen. Russell Pearce).
277 Party-Liners Again Reject Compassionate Reforms of Welfare System, CAL. CHRONICLE,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/view/100510 (quoting Cal. State
Sen. John Benoit).
278 Id.
279 Juana Summers, Missouri House Approves Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, But Proposal
Shows Trouble in Senate, ST. LOUIS TODAY, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news
/local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/article_12c95ddd-654b-56ed-943a-169704da04a6.html
(quoting Mo. State Sen. Gary Nodler).
280 Marshall Griffin, Missouri House Passes Bill to Require Drug Testing for Welfare
Recipients, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.publicbroadcasting.net
/kwmu/news.newsmain/article/0/0/1611354/St.Louis.Public.Radio.News/Mo.House
.passes.drug.testing.bill (quoting Mo. State Rep. Ellen Brandom).
281 Lawmaker Introduces Bill to Require Drug Tests for Public Assistance, CBS NEWS
AUGUSTA (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/42272572.html (quoting S.C.
State Rep. Rex Rice).
282 Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking Drug Testing to
Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases
/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html.
283 NY Spons. Memo., Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
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in twenty-seven legislatures since 2007,284 accounting for eighty percent of the iden-
tified drug testing legislation over the last three years. Ten legislatures— those of
Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee—have each produced multiple bills providing for suspi-
cionless testing,285 while seventeen others have each produced one such bill.286  By
contrast, only thirteen bills from seven states and the District of Columbia follow the
lead of earlier programs and limit invasive testing to circumstances supported by proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion,287 often established by a preliminary noninvasive
assessment of the entire applicant or recipient population.288
284 H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268,
116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S.
178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731,
105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess
(Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
285 See supra note 284.
286 See id. (Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming).
287 S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); Council 661, 17th Council Period
(D.C. 2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2009); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008);
H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
288 See, e.g., Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va.
2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
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Suspicionless testing under these bills takes one of two forms—it is either imposed
on an entire class of applicants or recipients or it is applied randomly to some subset of
the target population.  In this regard, thirty-one bills in nineteen states impose invasive
testing upon their entire target population,289 while seventeen bills in ten legislatures
impose testing on randomly selected individuals.290  Two bills combine these methods
by testing the entire population of applicants while randomly testing some subset of the
larger class of current recipients.291
2. The Attributes of Testing: Breadth, Process, and Consequences
The surveyed legislation varies to some extent regarding the breadth of the popu-
lation subject to drug testing, the steps taken to protect procedural integrity and personal
privacy, and the consequences of a positive test result.  On balance, a substantial ma-
jority of the proposed bills apply to the broadest possible target population, provide
very few, if any, privacy or procedural protections, and impose the harshest possible
sanction for a positive drug test.
With respect to the breadth of the subject population, drug testing may target aid
applicants, current recipients, or both.  Among the sixty-two identified bills introduced
289 H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R.
389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009);
H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 137, 35th
Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); Assemb. 3602, 231st
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–
2010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 2648, 105th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
290 S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb.,
1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 916, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).
291 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2008).
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since 2007, over half—thirty-five—reach both categories.292  Of the remaining bills,
sixteen apply to recipients alone293 while eleven are limited to applicants for assis-
tance.294  There are a few notable outliers.  Two Mississippi bills from 2009 expand the
subject population to include children as young as thirteen years old.295  In an egalitarian
nod, two bills require drug testing not only of applicants and recipients but also of all
candidates for the Illinois state legislature296 and all sitting members of the Missouri
General Assembly.297
292 S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R.
389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008);
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009);
S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513,
51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R.
1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.
Va. 2009).
293 S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008);
H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
294 Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2007); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess.
Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008);
S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007).
295 H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009).
296 H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
297 H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
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The testing itself requires the extraction and collection of bodily fluids and tissues
including blood,298 “urine, hair, saliva, sweat, or whatever [other] specimen proves to
be the most cost-effective.”299  Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the surveyed
legislation makes no mention of privacy protections for individuals facing such inti-
mately invasive procedures.300  Only two bills specifically provide for the collection of
samples with “due regard to the privacy of the individual” and “in a manner reasonably
calculated to prevent substitutions or interference”301 with the collected material.
With respect to the use and distribution of test results, the legislation likewise
imposes few restrictions.302  A handful of bills require that results be maintained in
confidence, with no public disclosure except by consent of the person tested or pursuant
to a judicial order.303  Three other bills specify that positive test results may not be used
in criminal proceedings.304  Only one bill combines these protections of confidentiality
and immunity from prosecution.305  Similarly, the vast majority of legislation offers no
procedural safeguards with regard to the testing process.306  Bills proposed in Indiana,307
Missouri,308 and Tennessee309 provide for a hearing or other appeal of a positive test
result, while a few others require specific notice prior to actual testing.310  Bills in
Illinois,311 Indiana,312 and Tennessee313 provide for the retesting of samples to rule out
298 H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
299 H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).
300 See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
301 S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); see S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2009).
302 See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
303 S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).
304 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008);
H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
305 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009).
306 See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
307 H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
308 H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
309 H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
310 H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
311 H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
312 H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
313 H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
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false positives.  Also to rule out false positives, a handful of bills allow individuals to
submit additional medical information that may provide an alternative explanation for
positive test results.314  Notwithstanding these provisions, fully two-thirds of the recent
legislation contains no privacy or procedural protections whatsoever.315
Finally, a substantial majority of the bills impose the harshest possible consequence
for a positive test result.  Over two-thirds of the identified legislation, from twenty-one
states, mandates the immediate termination or denial of benefits as the sanction for a
positive test.316  Of these bills, several deny aid without specifying when, if ever, bene-
fits might resume.317  Others permit individuals to reapply for assistance after some pre-
scribed period of ineligibility.318  Among the bills requiring the denial or termination of
314 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009).
315 See supra notes 284, 287.
316 S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2008); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg.
Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R.
830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 3007, 79th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
317 See, e.g., S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2008); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008);
H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R.
2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
318 See, e.g., S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 4452,
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aid to a primary beneficiary, a few provide that aid to dependents may continue through
disbursements to a third-party payee.319  By contrast, only seventeen bills allow benefits
to be paid to an individual who tests positive for illicit drug use, typically on condition
that the recipient participate in a drug rehabilitation treatment program.320
Across the identified legislation, the most common provisions are invariably the
harshest.  The typical bill applies without suspicion to the entire class of welfare appli-
cants and recipients, makes no provision for the protection of either the individual’s
privacy during the testing process or the security of test results, affords no proce-
dural recourse for individuals testing positive, and mandates the immediate denial
of aid to anyone identified as having used an illicit drug.  While it is impossible to pre-
dict whether such legislation ultimately will be enacted, the character and intensity of
legislative activity over the last three years suggests that the possibility is significant.
D. Two Visions of a Constitutional Response
The enactment of suspicionless drug testing legislation will force the federal courts
to answer, finally, the constitutional question left open by the Michigan litigation.321 
In assessing how the courts might approach the issue, the Michigan decisions are
highly instructive.  The district court in Marchwinski considered the issue within the
conventional parameters of the Fourth Amendment and reached the straightforward
conclusion that the state’s blanket drug testing proposal was impermissible.322  On
96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2009); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2009).
319 H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
320 H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2008); Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R.
2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009);
Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
321 See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
322 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed based on an entirely different, if unstated,
premise—that the poor constitute a subconstitutional class for purposes of the privacy
right and thus fall beyond the protections of conventional doctrine.323  These irrecon-
cilable approaches perfectly mirror the parallel controversy, discussed above, over the
application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right to the homes of welfare recipi-
ents.324  If the federal courts are asked again to consider the question in the context of
suspicionless drug testing, the divergent outcomes in the Michigan litigation will frame
for the judiciary an unambiguous choice.
1. Bodily Privacy: A Preface
At the core of the Fourth Amendment is “the individual’s legitimate expectations
that in certain places and at certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”325  When the
state seeks to intrude upon the body, it implicates the “most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy”326 grounded in the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole.”327  These deeply invested expectations trigger,
in turn, “the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches
of one’s person.”328
The Fourth Amendment traditionally guards this private sphere through the dual
requirements of probable cause and a warrant.  As the Court noted in Schmerber v.
California, both requirements apply with considerable force in the context of intrusions
upon the body.329  As to cause, the Schmerber Court noted:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [beyond the
323 309 F.3d 330.
324 See supra Part I.B.2.
325 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
326 Id. at 760.
327 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288
(1977)).
328 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). The highly protected status of the
body is recognized across other constitutional doctrines as well, most notably as a component
of liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 135 (1992); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79
(1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“[Roe v. Wade] . . .
may be seen . . . as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar
its rejection.”).
329 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966).
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body’s surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained.  In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evi-
dence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law
officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless
there is an immediate search.330
The requirement of judicial review plays an equally important role, as the Court also
underscored in Schmerber:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,
and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intru-
sions into the human body are concerned. . . .  The importance of
informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of
guilt is indisputable and great.331
While these requirements obviously do not prohibit a search of the body, they provide
a significant constraint “against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances,
or which are made in an improper manner.”332
In applying these principles, the Court has required that probable cause support the
extraction of blood from a drunk-driving suspect,333 barred suspicionless drug testing
of maternity patients for purposes of identifying child-abuse suspects,334 and prohibited
the extraction of a bullet from a suspect’s body even in the presence of probable cause,
given the gravity of the intrusion.335  Prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court similarly restricted the search of a suspect’s stomach under the Due
Process Clause336 and more recently has underscored the significant liberty interest
implicated when the state seeks to forcibly inject medication into a nonconsenting
person’s body.337  As these cases intuitively confirm, “The integrity of an individual’s
person is a cherished value of our society”338 and triggers “the greatest Fourth Amend-
ment protection.”339
Outside the context of criminal law enforcement, the Court has relaxed the require-
ments of the Warrant Clause in certain circumstances to permit the state to conduct
330 Id.
331 Id. at 770.
332 Id. at 768.
333 Id. at 770.
334 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–86 (2001).
335 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1985).
336 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
337 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990).
338 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
339 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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otherwise impermissible body searches for civil or administrative purposes.340  The
authority that embraces these circumstances—the special-needs doctrine341—bears
directly on the permissibility of recent drug testing proposals insofar as the searches at
issue rest on neither cause nor a warrant.  Under the doctrine, the Court engages in a
two-step analysis considering, first, whether the proposed search advances a “special
need” of the state, and, if so, whether the search strikes a reasonable balance between
individual privacy interests and the strength of the countervailing government object-
ive.342  The doctrine has been used primarily to justify targeted drug testing programs343
but has been applied in other contexts as well—for example, to sustain a warrantless
home search conducted as a condition of probation.344
The first and central inquiry under the doctrine is whether the state’s special need
is sufficiently compelling to suspend otherwise applicable constitutional restrictions.345 
In the absence of a special need, the analysis goes no further.346  While the need must
be unrelated to the ordinary demands of criminal law enforcement,347 a civil or admin-
istrative objective is not sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy the doctrine.  In addition,
the need “must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s acknowl-
edged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal
requirement of individualized suspicion.”348  Although the formulation is highly inde-
terminate,349 the practical application of the doctrine has typically involved one of two
permissible objectives: the promotion of public safety and the related protection of the
health and security of schoolchildren under the state’s in loco parentis control.350  Re-
garding the first rationale, the Court has stated that “where . . . public safety is not genu-
inely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter
how conveniently arranged.”351  Regarding the second, the Court has “caution[ed]
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional
340 See infra notes 345–52 and accompanying text.
341 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
342 See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1072
(10th Cir. 1998).
343 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner,
489 U.S. 602.
344 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
345 See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs., 156 F.3d at 1072.
346 Id.
347 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66.
348 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
349 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 165, 170 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992).
350 See Budd, supra note 10, at 397–98; cf. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
351 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).
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muster in other contexts.  The most significant element in this case is . . . that the Policy
was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public
school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.”352
There is considerable speculation about how far these two categories reach.353 
While the Court has underscored in recent opinions that special needs constitute a
“closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,”354
the decisional law demonstrates that the doctrine may be employed to permit suspi-
cionless body searches in circumstances that only tenuously relate to the sanctioned
rationales.355  Regardless of how distant the two categories may extend, however, they
cannot rationally stretch so far as to justify suspicionless drug testing of the entire popu-
lation of welfare applicants and recipients—for whom the state has neither in loco
parentis responsibility nor any encompassing public-safety concern.356  The constitu-
tionality of such proposals is accordingly highly doubtful under conventional doctrine,
as Wayne LaFave and others have observed.357
2. Principled Adjudication
Accepting this conventional account of the Fourth Amendment, the district court
in the Michigan litigation concluded that the challenged testing program failed to
advance any recognized special need and was thus impermissible.358  The district
court first noted that the declared purpose of the authorizing federal statute was to move
welfare recipients to work, and that the state’s drug testing program rested on the
complementary objective of “address[ing] substance abuse as a barrier to employ-
ment.”359  Since neither goal touched remotely on a public safety concern, the
district court concluded that the testing program was irreconcilable with the Su-
preme Court’s specification of permissible special needs.360
352 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
353 See, e.g., supra note 349; cf. Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference:
Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223,
1231–34 (2004).
354 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
355 See, e.g., Aubrey v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of school janitors on grounds that they hold safety-sensitive positions
and work closely with children).
356 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(d) (3d ed. 2007) (“While
federal legislation authorizes states to undertake suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients,
such action is not justified by . . . the Supreme Court’s drug testing decisions.”); see, e.g.,
Corinne A. Carey, Crafting a Challenge to the Practice of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients:
Federal Welfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in the War on Drugs,
46 BUFF. L. REV. 281 (1998); Socha, supra note 260, at 1118–19.
357 Id.
358 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139–40 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
359 Id. at 1140.
360 Id.
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The State nevertheless proposed that it sought to protect recipients’ children
from drug-related child abuse and thus pursued a safety-related objective as well.361 
After noting the post hoc nature of the rationale,362 the district court addressed its
implications:
[This] excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children
who receive Medicaid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants
or loans, public education or any other benefit from the State.  In
all cases in which the State offers a benefit on behalf of minor
children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the
care of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the
parents. . . .  “Such a categorical approach to an entire class of
citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our
democracy.”363
To the district court’s rejoinder might be added the fact that welfare recipients abuse
drugs at no greater rate than the general population364—and, thus, that the state has no
greater interest in stopping drug-related child abuse among welfare recipients than it
has with respect to the vast majority of other parents who receive some tax deduction,
credit, or similar subsidy on behalf of dependent children.365  Michigan’s child-safety
rationale would thus eviscerate the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of individualized
suspicion across the spectrum of American families—a result that is neither politically
nor doctrinally tenable.366
The court turned next to Michigan’s separate contention that its drug testing
scheme was authorized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyman v. James, which
upheld mandatory home visits by welfare caseworkers.367  The district court dismissed
the argument on two grounds.  First, as the district court noted, Wyman held that the
home visits at issue did not even constitute a Fourth Amendment search and authorized
the entries, in part, on that basis.368  Since it is indisputable that invasive drug testing is
361 Id. at 1141.
362 Id. at 1141–42.
363 Id. at 1142 (quoting Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 342 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
364 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
365 See, e.g., Alan Berube, Individual Income Tax Credits as Social Policy in Rural America,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 151, 155–59 (2006).
366 Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). Outside the context of wel-
fare, at least one other court has rejected a suspicionless drug testing proposal on grounds that
parents have no diminished expectation of privacy simply by virtue of the state’s general interest
in the well-being of their children. See State v. Moreno, 203 P.3d 1000, 1008–12 (Utah 2009)
(barring drug testing of the parents of delinquent minors for purposes of assuring that they
set a good example for their children).
367 400 U.S. 309 (1971); see Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.
368 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317; supra notes
106–09 and accompanying text.
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a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Wyman analysis is obviously
irrelevant in that respect.369
Michigan argued, however, that Wyman’s alternative holding—that the home visits
constituted a reasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment370—supported its testing
program by establishing that welfare applicants have a generally diminished expectation
of privacy as a result of their voluntary request for assistance.371  The district court re-
jected the argument in light of the conflicting analysis in Chandler v. Miller, which
struck down a suspicionless drug testing program directed at candidates for public
office.372  As the court noted, the act of seeking elected office is considerably more vol-
untary than submitting an application for public assistance, which typically reflects
some measure of economic coercion.373  Nevertheless, the Chandler Court recognized
that candidates for political office possess a legitimate and defensible expectation of
privacy irrespective of the highly consensual nature of the activity at issue.374  Neces-
sarily, then, welfare recipients must possess an equally defensible privacy expectation
in the substantially less voluntary context within which they interact with the state.375 
Finally, the district court noted that Wyman predates the Supreme Court’s special-needs
jurisprudence and in particular the requirement articulated in Chandler that a safety-
related justification support a special-needs search.376  “To the extent that Wyman could
be construed as allowing otherwise, its holding is no longer viable.”377
Unable to identify either a special need or a credible basis to defer to the fading
authority of Wyman, the district court enjoined Michigan’s testing program as a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.378  In view of prevailing special needs authority, the
holding is a straightforward application of reasonably well-settled law.
3. Subconstitutional Adjudication
A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion
rooted in an entirely different, and frankly biased, set of analytic assumptions.379  The
opinion proceeds squarely in the tradition of the bifurcated Fourth Amendment and
offers arguments and rationales that are impossible to reconcile with conventional
369 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.
370 See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
371 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324.
372 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
373 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
374 Id.; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
375 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
376 Id. at 1143; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
377 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
378 Id. at 1144; see also Drug Tests as a Condition of Receiving Public Assistance, Op. Att’y
Gen. 07-84 (Tenn. 2007).
379 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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authority.380  To make sense of the opinion, one must accept at the outset the premise
that the poor inhabit a different constitutional universe where their presumed culpability
justifies intrusions that are otherwise at odds with traditional doctrine.  Throughout
the opinion, poverty is implicitly employed as a proxy for individualized suspicion as
the poor are cast as an inherently criminal, child-abusing, and drug addicted class.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision begins with the state’s asserted special need.  To ac-
commodate its substantive objectives, the court first reframed the governing standard
to drain the special-needs concept of virtually any limiting effect.  Rejecting the pro-
nouncement in Chandler that a permissible special need must be grounded in some
public safety concern,381 the court asserted instead that safety “is but one consideration”
and “need not predominate” in the special needs calculation.382  In support, the circuit
relied exclusively on Board of Education v. Earls,383 the Supreme Court’s latest opinion
dealing with the other rationale for a special needs search—the state’s in loco parentis
responsibility for schoolchildren under its care and supervision.384  In Earls, the Court
upheld a school’s suspicionless drug testing program for students involved in extra-
curricular activities on the expressly qualified basis that “Fourth Amendment rights . . .
are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot dis-
regard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”385  Moreover,
within that uniquely supervisory context, the Earls Court accepted as “correct” the
proposition that “safety factors into the special needs analysis” but concluded that
“the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children”
in the setting of a public school.386  To derive from Earls that safety “need not pre-
dominate”387 in a special-needs analysis beyond the context of public education—thus
trumping the express requirements of Chandler—is a “dubious conclusion”388 that
defies the terms of the opinion itself.
Having rewritten the constitutional standard to accommodate an open and unde-
fined set of additional special needs, the Sixth Circuit proceeded to manufacture an
amalgam of rationales that bear no relation to any preceding authority and that render
the doctrine nearly limitless in its application to the general population.  First, in a nod
to Chandler, the court embraced Michigan’s post hoc safety rationale for drug testing
and asserted without analysis that the program was designed to protect children from
380 See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 109, at § 10.3 (“[The opinion] misread Wyman and
reached the dubious conclusion that Earls, the Supreme Court’s latest school drug testing case,
trumped Chandler even outside a public school context”).
381 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
382 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 335.
383 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
384 Id.; see Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 334–35.
385 Earls, 536 U.S. at 829–30 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (1995)).
386 Id. at 836.
387 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 335.
388 LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.3.
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drug-related abuse.389  In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the authorizing federal
statute as well as Michigan’s own policy rationale made no mention of child safety in
justifying the testing at issue,390 ignored empirical data refuting the premise that welfare
parents abuse drugs at a significantly greater rate than the general population,391 and
declined to acknowledge the necessary implication of its argument: that any parent
could henceforth be subject to suspicionless drug testing simply by accepting a child-
related state subsidy.392
Moving further beyond the record, the Sixth Circuit next imagined that the drug
testing program might advance an even broader public safety concern—“the risk to the
public from the crime associated with illicit drug use and trafficking.”393  Reasoning
now in a factual vacuum, the court conjured the image of welfare-subsidized drug
dealers preying on a victimized public and declared that the threat constituted yet an-
other safety-related special need supporting universal drug testing among welfare
recipients.394  The characterization, however, bears no relation to available data estab-
lishing that no more than one in five welfare recipients even uses an illicit drug in a
given year,395 that no more than four percent of recipients are addicted,396 and that less
than six percent of applicants and recipients in related aid programs have lost benefits
based on drug-related criminal activity.397  The court’s analysis at this juncture mirrors
rational-basis review in the context of equal protection, where any imaginable justifi-
cation is sufficient to sustain the state’s conduct irrespective of the record or the state’s
actual objectives.398  Rational basis review is essentially synonymous with no review at
all,399 and its application in this context reduces the special-needs inquiry to pretense.400
389 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
390 See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
391 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
392 See supra notes 363–66 and accompanying text.
393 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
394 Id.
395 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
396 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
397 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARI-
OUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF
SELECTED BENEFITS 13–15 (2005) (setting forth data from public housing programs).
398 See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
399 Id.; cf. Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1283–84 (“Indeed, in the nearly twenty years that this
rule has been in effect, the Court has not invalidated a single poverty classification or social
welfare restriction.”).
400 To the extent that the circuit’s imagined crime-fighting rationale might envision testing as
a means of identifying specific criminal suspects, it would also run headlong into the first and
primary restriction placed on special-needs searches—that they be employed only for purposes
“divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
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Completing its reinvention of special needs, the court struck out beyond public
safety to declare yet another rationale for suspicionless searches—the state’s pedestrian
interest in the fiscal integrity of its benefits program.401  The court asserted, without
citation to any authority, that it is true “beyond cavil that the state has a special need
to insure that public moneys expended in the [program] are used by the recipients for
their intended purposes and not for procuring controlled substances . . . .”402  The impli-
cations of this claim are most sweeping of all.  Applicable to virtually any government
benefit, the rationale establishes that the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or
subsidy empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless searches to verify
that the beneficiary does not use the funds to buy contraband.  There is virtually no one
left who, in the wake of such reasoning, might remain protected from suspicionless
searches to advance the state’s generalized interest in assuring that its ubiquitous
largesse is not diverted to the purchase of illicit drugs.403
Having devised an unprecedented set of special needs to justify Michigan’s testing
program,404 the Sixth Circuit was obliged to proceed to the next step of the special-
needs inquiry and balance the strength of the government’s rationale against the indi-
vidual privacy interests at stake.405  Acknowledging that this inquiry required consider-
ation of the efficacy of Michigan’s search policy in meeting the government’s asserted
goals,406 the Sixth Circuit declared that blanket drug testing was indeed an effective
method of addressing drug abuse—for the sole reason that Michigan’s program applied
universally to the applicant and recipient population and thus assertedly would catch
all abusers in its net.407  As discussed above, however, blanket drug testing is actually
an ineffective method of identifying drug-related abuse and associated dysfunction.408 
The overwhelming majority of positive drug tests will be for the casual use of mari-
juana, which implicates none of the state’s purported concerns.409  Conversely, much
of the most serious drug abuse will avert detection due to the speed with which such
drugs are metabolized following ingestion.410  Rather than an effective means of ad-
dressing the state’s interest in drug-related abuse and crime, blanket drug testing of the
401 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, 319 F. 3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
402 Id. Notably, recent drug testing legislation has incorporated this rationale. A bill intro-
duced in Louisiana in 2009 declares that the state has a “compelling interest in providing
safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation of entitlement benefits.” H.R. 137, 35th Reg.
Sess. (La. 2009).
403 Cf. Note, supra note 153, at 2001–02.
404 See Gustafson, supra note 74, at 679.
405 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336–37.
406 Id. at 336; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
407 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
408 See supra Part II.A.3.
409 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
410 See supra notes 244 & 247 and accompanying text.
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welfare population is precisely the kind of symbolic empty gesture that the Supreme
Court has repudiated as a basis for suspicionless searches in other contexts.411
The results of Michigan’s brief period of testing corroborate this conclusion.  Of
the 258 participants, only twenty-one tested positive for an illicit drug, all but three of
whom for marijuana use alone.412  Thus, of the subject population, only 8.1 percent
tested positive for any drug, and only 1.2 percent were identified as using a serious
illicit drug.413  In the recounting of the Sixth Circuit, however, this data reduced to the
following fiction: “[T]he tests so far conducted have resulted in approximately ten
percent positive results, demonstrating that the means utilized by Michigan are effective
in detecting drug abuse among aid recipients.”414
Positing the efficacy of drug testing, the Sixth Circuit turned next to the counter-
vailing privacy interests and predictably concluded that welfare recipients lack a defen-
sible expectation of bodily privacy.415  The court based this conclusion on the novel
assertion that welfare is a heavily regulated “industry”416 that carries with it “a corre-
spondingly diminished expectation of privacy.”417  In support of the proposition, the
Sixth Circuit cited—but did not quote—a passage from Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Association that referenced the scope of industrial regulation in upholding
a drug testing program for certain railroad employees.418  The actual language of the
cited passage, however, demonstrates a quite different and especially unhelpful point:
“[T]he expectations of privacy of [the tested] employees are diminished by reason of
their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of the covered employees.”419 
The diminished expectation of privacy in Skinner, then, was not a function of regula-
tion generally but of the specific employees’ state-supervised obligation to protect
public safety—a concern that obviously offers no support for Michigan’s blanket drug
testing scheme.
The Sixth Circuit thus advanced a proposition bearing no relation to the holding in
Skinner: that the state’s general power to search regulated businesses420 establishes by
analogy an equivalent power to search the blood and urine of “heavily regulated” wel-
fare recipients.421  It is not an elusive distinction, however, that
411 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
412 See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
413 Id.
414 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
415 Id. at 336–37.
416 Id. at 336.
417 Id. at 337.
418 Id. at 336–37.
419 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
420 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
421 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.
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the general acceptance of random inspection programs with respect
to the scrutiny of business premises does not support a comparable
approach as to drug testing of [individuals] . . . . Urinalysis in par-
ticular is more intrusive, as it involves a “basic offense to human
dignity.” This means, for one thing, that random drug testing
should be rarely allowed and only upon a showing considerably
more substantial than would suffice to support a random business
inspection scheme.422
Needless to say, the suggestion that a welfare recipient’s expectation of bodily privacy
is analogous to the privacy of a meat-packing plant is an improbable stretch.  Were it
not, the Sixth Circuit’s argument would subject virtually anyone receiving a regulated
government benefit to suspicionless searches within the administrative scope of the
program in question.  By unhinging privacy expectations from public safety, as in
Skinner, and linking them instead to the degree of government regulation, the court’s
argument would empower the state to unilaterally disable the Fourth Amendment—
since by simply increasing the extent of its regulatory intrusion, government would
simultaneously invalidate any countervailing privacy expectation.423  So construed,
the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a perfectly circular nullity.424
The circuit completed its analysis by turning to Wyman v. James.425  “Even were
we to conclude that the state could not show a special need sufficient to justify the
drug testing,” the court declared, plaintiffs would still lose under Wyman.426  Reliance
on the superseded and idiosyncratic authority of Wyman to trump the special-needs
analysis, however, is impossible as a matter of ordinary adjudication.  First, as the
district court noted, Wyman’s analysis rests on a variety of assumptions that are irrec-
oncilable with more recent special needs authority, including the proposition that the
voluntary nature of a request for assistance generally diminishes a recipient’s expec-
tation of privacy with respect to all related administrative interactions.427  If Wyman’s
voluntariness analysis were still good law, the Supreme Court’s subsequent special-
needs decisions in the employment context would have been reasoned in an entirely dif-
ferent fashion, since in each the individual’s relationship with the state was the product
of a voluntary employment arrangement that would have obviated any further inquiry
under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.428  Indeed, as the district court noted, the outcome
422 LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.2(g) (footnote omitted).
423 See Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1268.
424 Id.
425 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
426 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.
427 See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 60 Fed. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf. Marchwinski, 309
F.3d at 337.
428 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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itself would have changed in Chandler v. Miller, since the activity in question—
running for public office—is voluntary as well.429  Similarly, Wyman’s reference to
the state’s interest “in ensuring that the money it gives to recipients is used for its
intended purposes”430 echoes the Sixth Circuit’s effort to devise a special need on the
same fiscal-oversight grounds and suffers from the same insurmountable flaws.431 
Thus, to accede to Wyman in the face of the conflicting requirements of the special-
needs doctrine necessarily requires that one accept a poverty-specific Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine which, through Wyman, bypasses the protections afforded all others. 
In dismissing special needs in deference to Wyman, this is precisely the conclusion
reached by the Sixth Circuit.
Beyond the fact that the special-needs doctrine supersedes Wyman and forecloses
its reasoning, the Wyman analysis itself provides quite limited support for the privacy
intrusion at issue in the Michigan litigation.  In Wyman, caseworkers visited the homes
of welfare recipients for the specific purpose of assessing their needs and the welfare
of dependent children.432  The Wyman Court relied heavily on this rehabilitative object-
ive to uphold the contested practice—emphasizing in particular that the entries were
friendly,433 involved no close inspection of the premises,434 and were designed not to
penalize program participants but to aid in their assistance.435  By contrast, drug testing
is punitive, invasive, and has only an attenuated connection to either the needs of re-
cipients or the well-being of their children.436  Ignoring these differences, the Sixth
Circuit declared that the Michigan program was analogous to Wyman because “[t]he
State is attempting to insure that children are adequately cared for” and that “ascer-
taining whether the adult recipients . . . are abusing controlled substances is directly
related to that end.”437
Having thus mischaracterized all material aspects of the special-needs inquiry and
its relationship to Wyman, the Sixth Circuit reached the predestined conclusion that
Michigan’s drug testing program was constitutionally permissible.438  The breadth and
magnitude of the court’s analytic errors, and their improbable implications if applied
beyond the context of welfare administration, highlight the fundamentally different type
429 See Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. at 1143; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
430 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 338; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318–19.
431 See supra notes 401–03 and accompanying text.
432 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319–20.
433 Id. at 322–23.
434 Id. at 320–21 (“snooping in the home [was] forbidden”).
435 Id. at 317, 319–20; see, e.g., id. at 319 (“The emphasis of the [program] is upon the home,
upon ‘close contact’ with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient ‘to a condition of self-
support,’ and upon the relief of his distress.”).
436 See supra notes 408–13 and accompanying text.
437 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.3
(noting that the Marchwinski court “misread Wyman”).
438 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 338.
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of adjudication at issue here.  To make sense of Marchwinski in light of the conven-
tional Fourth Amendment, one must accept that the analysis operates outside the con-
straints of normal doctrine—as illustrated by the court’s desultory effort to reconcile
its reasoning with otherwise binding authority.  The Sixth Circuit’s opinion inhabits
a separate and subconstitutional dimension of the law, demarcated by the court’s in-
stinctive sense that welfare recipients are simply different when it comes to the question
of privacy.  Within that separate sphere, poverty functions as a proxy for cause and the
requirements of individualized suspicion yield to the presumptive culpability of an
imagined class of drug addicts, criminals, and welfare queens.
The fate of Michigan’s testing program, however, was still not settled.  On plain-
tiffs’ petition for en banc review, the full Sixth Circuit vacated the panel opinion,439
reheard the matter, and ultimately upheld the district court’s injunction by an equally
divided vote announced in a four-sentence order.440  That divided and conclusory reso-
lution, while bringing an end to Michigan’s testing program, simply underscored the
broader challenges that face indigent litigants asserting privacy interests.  The question
should not have been remotely close: neither the special-needs doctrine nor Wyman
provides any principled basis to inflict suspicionless body searches upon the entire
population of welfare recipients.  The full circuit’s equivocation in addressing the
question merely deferred the issue to another day and compounded the sense that
few rights come easily to the American poor.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution remains an elusive and often hollow promise for impoverished
Americans.  Facing doctrine that formally rejects both positive socioeconomic rights
as well as any meaningful protection against discriminatory state action, the poor as
a class are explicitly deconstitutionalized in relation to the law.  Beyond doctrinal indif-
ference, however, the indigent face affirmative bias as well.  Across a range of funda-
mental interests, the judiciary has established a bifurcated system of rights enforcement
that denies indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable constitutional guar-
antees.  The construed Constitution is thus not merely irrelevant but at times quite
hostile to the interests of those most in need of its protection.
This Article proposes a modest step forward in the effort to reset this constitutional
relationship: to finally repudiate the longstanding bias that burdens indigent litigants
seeking to vindicate basic privacy rights.  In a series of decisions stretching from
Wyman to Marchwinski and Sanchez, the federal appellate courts have crafted a sub-
constitutional privacy doctrine that subjects welfare recipients to unique and humiliating
intrusions.  The decisions reflect the familiar premise that the poor constitute an inher-
ently culpable class and thus that poverty itself may be used as a proxy for cause in
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justifying suspicionless intrusions.  In rejecting this caricature, the district court in
Marchwinski took the Constitution at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on
its conventional terms to uphold the poor’s basic right to bodily autonomy.  The pros-
pect of litigation around the flood of new drug testing proposals may offer the federal
judiciary a chance to revisit its choice between these two starkly different visions of
the privacy right, and to finally remedy an enduring injustice.
The choice should not be difficult.  Embracing neutral adjudication in this context,
however, would represent a decisive shift in the judiciary’s treatment of impoverished
Americans.  The opportunity may soon arrive for the courts to take that small but de-
fining step.  It will be an occasion not only to redeem a corrupted doctrine but to affirm
for the poor the legitimating promise of constitutional adjudication itself.
